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ABSTRACT
We document a somewhat surprising regularity:  of the many countries that have used IPO auctions,
virtually all have abandoned them.  The common explanations given for the lack of popularity of the
auction method in the US, viz., issuer reluctance to try a new experimental method, and underwriter
pressure towards methods that lead to higher fees, do not fit the evidence.  We examine why auctions
have failed and verify, to the extent possible, that they are consistent with what academic theory predicts.
 Both uniform price and discriminatory auctions are plagued by unexpectedly large fluctuations in
the number of participants.  The free rider problem and the winner's curse hamper price discovery
and discourage investors from participating in auctions.  Calculating the optimal bids in large multi-unit
common value auctions with endogenous entry imposes a huge computational burden.  With IPOs
taking place sporadically, and each firm being different, auctions are likely to end up being unstable.
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"Improbable as it is, all other explanations are more improbable still." 
Sherlock Holmes in "Sliver Blaze," 1892, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
 
 
Book building is the primary method through which initial public offerings (IPOs) are 
brought to the market in the United States (US).  An ongoing debate in the academic literature 
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the book building method, relative to sealed bid 
auctions.    On  the  one  hand,  the  greater  control  and  flexibility  of  book  building  provides 
substantial benefits to issuers.
1  On the other hand, the book building procedure necessarily 
gives the underwriter substantial discretion over allocations.  When agents are given discretion, 
there is always the potential for abuse, and the scandals following the internet bubble suggest 
that at least some abuses have occurred in practice
2.  Moreover, there is a  general  agency 
problem between underwriters and issuers that has not yet been fully explored for IPOs.
3  Thus 
there are both advantages and disadvantages to the flexibility offered by book building.  
  In the search for an alternative, much of the focus has been on auctions, which have 
been extremely successful in a wide range of alternative settings.  With sealed bid auctions, 
theory also offers trade-offs – auction theory predicts that sealed bid auctions will lead to very 
accurate pricing under some circumstances but to substantial problems under others.  In this 
case,  the  theoretical  differences  are  in  the  underlying  assumptions  regarding  information 
structures and the determinants of entry.  If information is endowed (i.e. costless) and bidder 
entry is predictable, auctions should be relatively efficient.  But if accurate estimates of IPO 
share values are difficult to produce and entry is uncoordinated, theory predicts that auction 
outcomes may be far less desirable (see Sherman, 2005).   
  Because theory predicts varying outcomes for both auction and book building IPOs, it is 
worth examining the available evidence regarding the track records of each method.  In this 
paper we offer evidence on overall usage patterns for many countries – the ‘market test’ - and 
then examine IPO auction outcomes in more detail.  We find that, when standard auctions have 
                                                 
1 As first shown by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990).  Ritter and Welch (2002), 
Ljungqvist (2004) and Wilhelm (2005) offer reviews of the academic IPO literature. 
2   See Loughran and Ritter (2004) for discussion of the scandals and overall trends in IPO underwriting. 




had  to  compete  with  another  method  -  either  with  fixed  price  public  offers
4  or  with  book 
building - auctions have been driven out.   
  The lack of popularity of auctions cannot be explained by either lack of familiarity or 
by differences in underwriting fees.  The fees for fixed price public offers in most countries 
have been the same as those for auctions, leaving investment banks with no incentive to favor 
one method over the other based on fees.  In spite of that, when issuers have been allowed to 
choose between fixed price public offers and auctions, the former method has prevailed and 
auctions have lost out
5.  And when fixed price public offers later were faced with competition 
from book building, the fixed price public offer method has generally lost out, although not as 
completely as the auction method. 
The  observation  that  auctions  have  consistently  lost  out  to  other  methods  is  an 
important piece of evidence but is not, by itself, sufficient to conclude that the predictions of 
auction theory are correct.  We therefore examine the reasons why auctions have failed and 
verify, to the extent possible, that they are consistent with auction theory in an IPO setting. 
The auction method is old and well established, and has been particularly successful for 
the  largest  security  issue  markets  –  those  for  government  debt,  particularly  US  Treasury 
securities; and auctions have been frequently used for new preferred stock issues in the United 
Kingdom  (UK),  particularly  for  government-owned  utilities
6.    Treasury  auctions  are  held 
frequently  at  regular  time  intervals,  with  a  core  of  regular  participants.    Further,  close 
substitutes to the securities being issued are already trading actively in the market, making 
valuation relatively easy and precise
7.  Preferred stocks of regulated utilities are relatively easy 
to value since they resemble high quality bonds.  In contrast, IPOs occur less frequently, at 
sporadic intervals, and their value is difficult to determine.  Each issue is different and may 
                                                 
4  With fixed price public offers, the price is set before any information on demand is received, as shown by 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994, Table 2).  With book building (a term coined in the 1990s), the underwriter 
arranges for investors to attend a road show and then collects indications of interest, which are used to fill (build) 
the order book.  The offering price is set only after the order book is full, giving the underwriter some idea of 
demand.  With standard auctions, pricing and allocation are based on bids, using pre-established rules.  Sherman 
(2005) argues that the main difference between the methods, from a regulatory standpoint, is the underwriter’s 
discretion  over  allocations  with  book  building.    With  either  fixed  price  public  offers  or  sealed  bid  auctions, 
underwriters may, and sometimes do, hold road shows before the offer price is set.  They are allowed to ask for 
feedback but, without control over allocations, they cannot give investors an incentive to offer reliable feedback. 
5   The only exception that we know of is France, which used a unique auction method that discouraged free riders. 
6   In the six month period from Oct. 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, all seven preferred stock issues in the UK used 
"Offers for Sale by Tender", i.e. auctions.  The issuers were all local waterworks or water companies. 




attract a different set of participants.  Therefore, theory predicts that IPO auctions may face 
wide variations in the number of participants.  We find evidence supporting this prediction. 
A well established problem in auction theory is the winner’s curse faced by bidders in a 
common value setting.  Auction participants can adjust for this by shaving their bids, but this 
adjustment  depends  on  the  number  of  other  investors  that  choose  to  enter  the  auction.    If 
bidders  do  not  know  how  many  will  participate  in  the  auction,  there  may  be  unpleasant 
surprises.  Auctions that have an unexpectedly large number of random entrants will on average 
be grossly oversubscribed and overpriced, while those that, by chance, have an unexpectedly 
low number of participants may be undersubscribed.  We find that this is indeed the case. 
When it is costly to gather information relevant to valuing a new issue, investors who 
do so must be rewarded.  Standard auctions do not guarantee this.  In fact, in uniform price 
auctions,  some  participants  may  have  an  incentive  to  free  ride  on  the  effort  of  others,  by 
bidding  high.    Any  such  free  riding  will  make  the  auction  clearing  price  volatile  and 
uninformative, contributing to the failure of the market for the issue.  We find evidence of this. 
The winner’s curse and free rider problems can be overcome if all bidders adjust their 
entry and bidding decisions accordingly, but this is complicated.  Large multi-unit IPO auctions 
will work only if essentially all potential participants are highly knowledgeable, disciplined and 
sophisticated, yet the very nature of IPOs – occurring sporadically, with each issuer different – 
makes it difficult for millions of potential investors to all obtain that high level of skill and 
sophistication.  If only a small fraction of potential investors fail to reach that level, it may not 
be  optimal  for  sophisticated  investors  to  enter  at  all.    We  find  suggestive  evidence  that 
unsophisticated return-chasers have tended to overbid, driving away other bidders. 
The  magnitude  of  underpricing  is  often  mentioned  as  a  disadvantage  of  the  book 
building  method.    However,  underpricing  in  fixed  price  offers  tends  to  be  larger  than 
underpricing under either auctions or book building.   In spite of that, we find that the fixed 
price public offer method has driven out auctions, when both were allowed.  Hence the money 
left on the table through underpricing, in and of itself, does not appear to be the primary issue
8.   
Discriminatory auctions have many of the same shortcomings as standard uniform price 
auctions.  Both discriminatory and uniform price auctions suffer from uncertainty about the 
                                                 
8      In  other  words,  objective  functions  for  issuers  that  are  based  on  IPO  proceeds  alone  appear  inadequate.  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) offer a more general objective function.  In addition, Sherman and Titman (2002), 




number of bidders, and neither guarantees that a stable set of serious investors has an incentive 
to devote time and resources to evaluating each offering.  The most successful IPO auctions 
have been of the “dirty”
 9 type that attempt to approximate the book building approach.     
The debate on IPO methods in the US has largely focused on two extremes:  either the 
status quo, or the use of standard sealed bid auctions, which mandate simple, rigid allocation 
and pricing rules.  There are, however, alternatives that fall somewhere in between the opaque 
allocation system currently used and the elimination of all underwriter discretion or control.  
Jagannathan  and  Sherman  (2005)  propose  reforming  the  bookbuilding  method  to  introduce 
greater transparency of the allocation process, in a way that still allows underwriters to consider 
all relevant factors when allocating and pricing offerings.  Large fund management companies 
already use such systems to determine allocations of trades, taking into account many variables 
in a balanced, relatively transparent way.    
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I establishes trends in the use of 
IPO methods, including the many countries that have tried and abandoned the auction method.  
Section II shows that the failure of auctions cannot be explained by lack of familiarity or by 
pressure from investment banks to use book building. Section III lays out the problems that we 
would  expect  to  find  with  IPO  auctions  in  theory,  including  the  winner’s  curse  with 
endogenous entry (III.A), the free rider problem (III.B), and the overall difficulties reaching a 
robust,  stable  equilibrium  (III.C).    We  conclude  this  section  with  a  general  summary  of 
theoretical predictions regarding large, multi-unit sealed bid auctions (III.D).   
  Section IV examines evidence of uncertainty in IPO auctions, including fluctuations in 
the number of bidders (IV.A), undersubscription (IV.B) and overall instability (IV.C).  In the 
subsection on instability, we would first explore Argentina' s experience (IV.C.1), where the 
success of the first auction led too many investors to flood into the second, precipitating a 
market crash; then Singapore' s two year experiment with the method (IV.C.2), and last our 
more quantitative analysis of Singapore' s experience (IV.C.3).   Section V concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                           
function includes more than just maximizing expected one-time proceeds.     
9   A “dirty” IPO auction is a uniform price auction where they “leave something on the table” by pricing below 
market-clearing. Uniform price auctions, often mistakenly called Dutch or Vickrey auctions, are multi-unit sealed 
bid auctions in which all winning bidders pay the same price.  The price paid may be the market-clearing price (the 
highest price that allows all shares to be sold), or it may be below the clearing price, leading to increased rationing.  
We will focus on X+1
st price auctions, where the company is auctioning off X shares and the price is based on the 
X  +  1
st  highest  bid.    In  practice,  for  IPO  auctions  with  thousands  of  bidders  for  millions  of  shares,  it  is 





I.  Global Patterns 
 
  When  Margaret  Thatcher,  Prime  Minister  of  the  UK,  began  privatizing  British 
companies, she set off major changes around the world in government, in industries and in IPO 
methods.  Before then, the IPO method in most countries outside the US was fixed price public 
offers (a.k.a. open offers, universal offers or often simply called “the IPO method”).  The trend 
towards floating extremely large public companies forced countries to try new methods and to 
coordinate IPOs across borders, since many privatizations were too big to be absorbed entirely 
by the local market.  The wave of privatizations led to experimentation first with auctions and 
then with the US book building method. 
  Table  1  summarizes  the  IPO  methods  used  in  various  countries.    More  detailed 
information  is  given  in  Appendix  D,  which  is  available  on  the  Social  Science  Research 
Network
10  and  on  request,  and  which  shows  that  most  countries  allow  the  use  of  many 
methods.  We do not know of any country that had formerly allowed auctions and then changed 
their regulations to prohibit or limit them – the general trend in the last two decades has been to 
allow greater choice among issuers.  The book building method was once rare outside the US 
but is now common.  Auctions have been tried in more than 20 countries but are rare today.   
  The rarity of IPO auctions is not due to unfamiliarity.  Auctions were used in Italy, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK in the 1980s, and in Argentina, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Turkey in the 1990s, but they were abandoned in all of these countries well before book 
building was introduced.  Auctions were required for many years in Japan, yet quickly vanished 
once book building was allowed.   
  In  France,  auctions  were  popular  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990s.    On  the  regulated 
exchanges, they gradually lost market share to a restricted form of book building over several 
years, then dried up quickly in 1999 when a more standard form of book building was allowed.  
Auctions continued to be used on the unregulated over-the-counter market (the Marche Libre or 
Free Market) for several more years, although they eventually seem to have dried up there, 
                                                                                                                                                           
auction, each winning bidder pays his or her own bid. 
10   At http://ssrn.com/abstract=892026. Appendix A gives additional information on IPO auction methods in 
various countries.  It should be noted that Table 1 focuses on methods used within various countries.  Issuers may 
instead list elsewhere, rather than in the domestic market.  Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) examine 




also.  There were, however, two IPO auctions in France in early 2005
11, which came after there 
had been no auctions on regulated French exchanges for half a decade.  It remains to be seen 
whether the two auctions indicate a temporary phenomenon inspired by Google. 
  Auctions were the only method allowed in Israel for a decade.  The law requiring their 
use expired in December, 2003, although book building was still banned.  The only IPOs that 
we know of in Israel since then have been debt rather than equity IPOs.  Of those debt IPOs, 
two of the three effectively chose fixed price public offer, rather than an auction
12.  Legislation 
that would allow book building is pending but has not yet been passed. 
  Many countries have used hybrids – combinations of any two of the three methods.  
There have been hybrid auction/public offer and auction/book building  IPOs, but the most 
common  combination  is  book  building/public  offer.    For  most  hybrids,  book  building  (or 
sometimes an auction) is used to set the price and to allocate shares to institutional and foreign 
investors, while a fixed price public offer tranche is reserved for local retail investors that do 
not participate in the price-setting process.  Hybrid book building/auctions on the exchange are 
used in Chile because of regulations, but the offer price is set through book building
13.   
  In  Latin  America,  auctions  have  been  used  in  Brazil  and  Peru  in  the  past.    Latin 
American markets were quiet for much of the last decade, with delistings outnumbering listings 
in Brazil, Argentina and Chile
14.  Thus it was hard to predict if auctions were gone completely.  
However, Brazilian, Chilean and later Argentinean IPO markets began picking up in 2004-
2005, and book building has been the dominant method, with no auctions that we know of.  
  Since 1995, Taiwan has allowed both auctions and book building, in addition to the 
traditional fixed price public offers.  Taiwan’s auctions are similar to those that were once 
required, and are still allowed, in Japan – discriminatory (pay-what-you-bid) auctions followed 
                                                 
11    The two 2005 auctions were for Cafom, on the Second Marche in January and for MG International, on 
Alternext in June.  Cafom chose an unusually narrow range for accepted bids -  the minimum bid was ￿11.65; the 
offering price was ￿13.50; and only bids between ￿13.50 and ￿14 were accepted, although bids had gone as high 
as ￿20.  There have been no further auctions in France as of July, 2006. 
12   The actual restriction was against setting a maximum price in an auction.  Technically, all IPOs even before the 
10-year restriction were auctions, but issuers were allowed to set a maximum as well as a minimum price for the 
auction.  Issuers before 1993 tended to set their maximum price so low that the offering was highly like to price at 
the upper limit, effectively making it a fixed price offer.  Since December, 2003, at least two of the first three debt 
IPOs chose to set a maximum price (actually a minimum yield), effectively using the fixed price method. 
13    Pension funds may only purchase shares through an exchange in Chile, so some IPO shares are sold on the 
floor of the exchange, after the offering price has been set and the rest of the shares have been allocated through 
book building.  Such auctions may occur only minutes before general trading on the same floor.  In its 2003 IPO, 
La Polar cancelled the auction completely and distributed its shares through a bookbuild and through brokerages. 




by  fixed  price  public  offer  tranches.    Book  building  is  allowed  only  in  certain  restrictive 
circumstances
15 and is not used.  Auctions were initially popular but lost market share over 
time, with more and more issuers returning to fixed price public offers. 
  In the US, the investment bank WR Hambrecht has been encouraging issuers to use 
auctions  since  mid-1999.    The  method  got  much  publicity  when  Google,  a  popular  search 
engine company, chose to use the auction method for its August, 2004 IPO, but still the auction 
method is not popular in the US  As of September, 2006, there have been 18 US IPO auctions, 
17 of them using WR Hambrecht’s OpenIPO auction method. 
  Thus out of 46 countries, auctions have been tried in more than 20, and yet all except 
France, Israel, Taiwan and the US seem to have abandoned them entirely, and auctions are rare 
even in these last four countries.  Book building is gaining in popularity or is already the 
dominant method in 34 of the 46 countries.  Fixed price public offer is still used in smaller 
countries and for smaller offerings, and is common for the retail tranche of hybrids. 
 
II.  Auctions versus Bookbuilding: Popular Explanations 
II.A.  Were Issuers Unwilling to Try a New Method? 
One explanation for the low numbers of IPO auctions in the US is that the auction 
method is simply too new and experimental, and that issuers are afraid to try an unproven 
method.  However, this ‘lack of familiarity’ argument cannot explain the overall rejection of 
the auction method around the world.  First, the mere fact that IPO auctions have been used in 
nearly half the countries for which we have information implies that quite a few issuers have 
been willing to experiment.  More importantly, if we look at relative usage patterns over time, 
issuers have been most enthusiastic about IPO auctions when the method was new, and they 
generally became less willing to use it after they had become more familiar with the method. 
  Figure 1 shows the relative auction usage patterns over time in four countries.  For 
Singapore,  Taiwan  and  Turkey,  the  main  alternative  method  was  fixed  price  public  offers, 
which had been the traditional method in those countries.  Auctions were first allowed in 1993 
                                                 
15   when the majority of the shares sold are primary.  Auctions may only be used when the majority are secondary 
shares  (sold  by  current  stockholders).    Most  companies  planning  an  IPO  first  issue  new  shares  to  existing 
stockholders, who then sell the shares to the public, thus making the firms ineligible to use book building.  This is 





16 and Turkey, and in 1995 in Taiwan.  In France, both auctions and fixed price 
public offers had been used for decades, but book building was first introduced in the 1990s, 
while unrestricted book building was only allowed beginning in 1999. 
  As can be seen from Figure 1 for the three countries in which the IPO auction method 
was newly introduced, auctions captured their greatest market share early on, with two-thirds or 
more of issuers choosing to use auctions when they were relatively new.  As issuers became 
more familiar with the method over time, a lower proportion of them chose to use the auction 
method.  Hence, it is hard to argue that, in these countries, the disappearance of IPO auctions 
was due to lack of familiarity or to an unwillingness of issuers to try a new method. 
  One obvious question is whether issuers in these countries were truly allowed to choose 
freely between IPO methods.  Although there were no regulatory restrictions that prevented 
issuers from using auctions, strong differences between the groups of issuers using different 
methods might imply some other sort of barrier, such as underwriter reluctance to underwrite 
auctions for some issuers.  Therefore, in Tables 2 and 3,  we compare fixed price public offers 
and auctions in Singapore, Turkey and on the French Free Market based on both industry and 
amount of funds raised
17.   
      II.A.1  Singapore 
  Table  2.A  presents  data  from  the  Singapore  Exchange  (SGX;  formerly  the  Stock 
Exchange  of  Singapore  or  SES)  for  both  Main  Board  and  Sesdaq  offerings.    Sesdaq  was 
established to attract smaller, younger companies, and had more relaxed listing requirements.
18  
The fixed price public offers on Sesdaq were substantially smaller than any of the Main Board 
IPOs, but the two Sesdaq auctions were much larger than other Sesdaq IPOs and raised more 
than the median amount raised by Main Board auctions or fixed price public offers.  Hence the 
two Sesdaq auctions are comparable to Main Board offerings, in terms of size.  It is possible 
that most Sesdaq listings were too small to be able to use the auction method, so much of our 
later analysis will be reported both including and excluding Sesdaq offers.   
                                                 
16   The graph shows only uniform price auctions for Singapore.  Singapore also had one discriminatory auction in 
1991 and one in 1992.  Uniform price auctions were first allowed in 1993. 
17   Comparisons of French Second and Nouveau offerings can be found in Derrien and Womack (2003) and 
Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2006).  Hsu and Hung (2005) compare Taiwan IPOs by method. 
18    Requirements for a Main Board listing included five years of operating experience and three successive years 
of profits, as well as S$15 million in paid-up capital, which was approximately US$9.4 million in early 1994.  All 




  For Main Board IPOs, the mean and median funds raised are smaller for fixed price 
public offers than for auctions, even when the Singapore Telecom (SingTel) auction, an outlier 
in terms of size, is excluded.  However the smallest auction was on the Main Board and raised 
only $15.7 million, slightly less than the smallest Main Board fixed price public offer.  The 
median funds raised was $48 million for auctions ($44 million excluding SingTel) and $38 
million for fixed price public offers.  Six of the 18 Main Board auctions raised less than the 
median for fixed price public offers.  Sunright, the last company to do an auction, raised $37.5 
million, which was slightly below the median fixed price public offer.  Their management later 
told us that they were given the choice of auction or fixed price, by the underwriter, fairly late 
in the process after the offer price and fees had been set.
19   
      II.A.2  France 
  Table 2.B presents French Free Market (Marche Libre) data from the Euronext website.  
In terms of offering size, the Free Market auctions were in the middle, attempting to raise only 
about half as much, on average, as book building IPOs but substantially more than fixed price 
public  offers.    The  largest  auctions  hoped  to  raise  quite  a  bit  more  than  the  average  for 
bookbuilds, while the smallest were smaller than the mean (but not the median) for fixed price 
public offers.  The amounts reported are based on the number of shares for sale, not the shares 
actually  purchased.    French  Free  Market  offerings  during  this  period  were  often  heavily 
undersubscribed, as we will discuss later in the paper.   
  Of the four countries whose usage patterns are shown in Figure 1, France differs from 
the others in several ways.  First, the auction method had been allowed for several decades in 
France. Second, a form of book building was in use during the period shown, in addition to 
auctions and fixed price.  Last, the disappearance of auctions from the regulated exchanges 
seems to have been driven by a regulatory shift.   
Derrien  and  Womack  (2003)  found  that  sequential  hybrid  book  building  was  less 
efficient than auctions in France.  While interpreting this finding it is important to keep in mind 
that before 1999, the only form of hybrid book building that was allowed in France was a 
                                                 
19   It should be noted that these auctions were open to all Singapore citizens, and that participation was relatively 
easy.  Orders were taken through ATMs (automated teller machines) beginning in 1993, so investors could place 
bids in most of the Singapore auctions studied in this paper by simply stopping by the closest ATM.  Some IPO 
auction supporters have claimed that past track records for the IPO auction method are inapplicable, because they 
did not include ‘new technology’ (i.e. the internet).  But countries around the world managed to open up their IPO 




sequential hybrid, where the price must be set many days in advance, to allow time for the 
public to place their orders.  As the modeling in Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) demonstrates, 
requiring that prices be set far in advance adds risk, leading to higher levels of underpricing.    
Once the more modern, simultaneous hybrid book building method was allowed in France in 
1999, auctions quickly vanished from the regulated exchanges
20.  The 1999 regulatory change 
seems to explain the timing of auctions drying up on the French regulated exchanges, although 
it does not explain why they were still used for several more years on the unregulated over-the-
counter Free Market (Marche Libré).   
      II.A.3  Turkey 
  Table  2.C  gives  data  on  IPOs  in  Turkey,  from  the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange  (ISE) 
website.  Auctions and fixed price IPOs were extremely similar in terms of size, while issues 
using the third method, Sales on the ISE were substantially smaller.  In this last method, the 
issuer registers an opening price and then is allowed to simply begin normal trading on the 
exchange at that price.  Sales on the ISE are typically preceded by private placements. 
      II.A.4  Categorization by Industry 
  Table 3 gives breakdowns of IPOs by industry, for these same three countries, showing 
that auctions were used in a broad range of industries.  The overall industry pattern is similar 
for auction and non-auction methods.   We also looked at the timing of the IPOs, to see whether 
they were spread out or clustered, and did not find excessive clustering of IPOs in one time 
period  for  any  of  the  three  countries.
21    These  findings  indicate  that  issuers  in  Singapore, 
France and Turkey were free to choose their auction method. 
  It is clear, in all four of the countries shown in Figure 1, that the disappearance of 
auctions was not due to issuers'  lack of familiarity with the auction method.  Similarly in Japan, 
issuers were forced to use auctions from 1989 to 1997.  In spite of the long period during which 
IPOs in Japan were accomplished exclusively through auctions, the method was abandoned as 
soon as issuers were given the option of instead using book building.  
                                                                                                                                                           
system to take bids through ATMs. 
20   With the exception of the two IPO auctions in 2005 that were mentioned in Section I.   
21   The importance of this has been shown by Schultz (2003). For Singapore, the mean number of days between 
auctions was 27 days, with a median of 24 and a standard deviation of 18 days.  There were 6 separate months 
with no IPOs, 4 months with only one, 6 months with 2 IPOs and only one month with 3 IPOs in the same month 
(February, 1994, with a Main Board IPO on February 2 and the only two Sesdaq IPOs on February 15 and 21).  
The longest gaps between IPOs were 57 days in 1993 and 54 days in 1994, both around the month of August (the 




  Of course, there is not enough evidence to conclusively reject the ‘lack of familiarity’ 
argument for each and every country.  It may explain why auctions never caught on in some 
countries with very limited usage, such as Germany, Australia or the US, or in countries that 
have never tried auctions at all.  It may also explain why corporate debt and seasoned equity 
auctions never caught on, even though there was a race between three investment banks to 
introduce online corporate bond auction platforms in 2000
22, and WR Hambrecht convinced an 
issuer to try its OpenFollowon online seasoned equity auction method
23.  But the overall IPO 
evidence is that issuers in many countries have been willing to experiment with both auctions 
and  book  building,  and  that  issuers  became  less  likely  to  choose  auctions  as  they  gained 
familiarity with the method.   
II.B.  Underwriter Pressure for Using the Bookbuilding Method 
  Another explanation suggested by Ausubel (2002) for the failure of issuers to use IPO 
auctions  is  that  investment  banks  have  pressured  issuers  to  use  book  building  rather  than 
auctions because the fees, and hence profits, are higher for book building.  This argument is 
somewhat inconsistent – it assumes that underwriters have sufficient market power to keep 
book  building  fees  artificially  high,  and  sufficient  power  to  force  issuers  to  use  the  book 
building method in spite of the high fees, but that they do not have sufficient power to demand 
artificially high fees for auctions
24.   
  Regardless,  this  argument  cannot  explain  the  disappearance  of  auctions  in  most 
countries, because auctions have usually been replaced by fixed price public offers, and public 
offer  fees  are  typically  as  low  as,  or  even  lower  than,  the  fees  for  auctions.    Ljungqvist, 
Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) show that average fees tend to be quite low for fixed price 
public offers across most countries, substantially below those for book building
25.   
                                                 
22   On August 10, Deutsche Bank and Bear Stearns each auctioned off their own debt on their newly-developed 
platforms,  while  WR  Hambrecht  held  its  first  OpenBook  debt  auction,  for  Dow,  on  August  15,  2000.    WR 
Hambrecht  handled  a  second  OpenBook  auction,  for  Ford  Motor  Credit,  in  March,  2001.    It  reportedly  also 
attempted an auction for Dayton Hudson, but the bid-taking system crashed during the auction. 
23   Overstock, a company that also went public through an OpenIPO, used the OpenFollowon method in May of 
2004 but chose a traditional marketed offering for its next follow-on in November, 2004. 
24   A perhaps related argument is given by Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2006), who show a correlation in 
France between greater publicity/analyst attention for IPOs and the use of book building rather than an auction 
(they do not analyze the fixed price public offers in their sample).  They argue that underwriters induced issuers to 
use book building by convincing them of the value of other services (more analyst attention) but do not explain 
why such services would be bundled only with book building, rather than with all three methods in use at the time. 




A  third  alternative  explanation  to  consider  is  that  underwriters  might  be  pressuring 
issuers to use methods that lead to higher initial returns, so that the underwriters can allocate 
the underpriced shares to their favored clients.  This explanation is often heard in the US but 
cannot explain the choice between auctions and fixed price public offers, since neither method 
allows the underwriter to control allocations
26.   
II.C.  Do Issuers Prefer the Method that Minimizes Expected Underpricing? 
  Much analysis of IPOs either implicitly or explicitly assumes that issuers always prefer 
the offering method that leads to the lowest expected initial return, regardless of risk or other 
considerations
27. There are, however, many reasons to believe that issuers care about other 
aspects of the process beyond just the expected initial return.  An IPO is an expensive way to 
raise  capital  and  is  seldom  worthwhile  if  the  company’s  one  and  only  goal  is  a  one-time 
fundraising, particularly since the costs of being public are on-going.   
  An IPO opens the way to future fundraising in the public markets and establishes a 
market price for the company’s stock.  The stock price is used as a benchmark by employees, 
customers, suppliers and competitors.  It affects employee morale as well as the company’s 
bargaining position in various types of negotiations.  Thus, an issuer benefits from establishing 
an accurate, sustainable long-term price, which may require a core of institutional investors that 
will be interested in following the company long term
28.   
  Another reason to go public is to give current stockholders such as the founders, venture 
capitalists and angel investors a chance to diversify by liquidating at least part of their holdings.  
Such investors usually cannot sell until the end of the lock up period and thus care about the 
eventual stock price, and not just either the offer price or the first day’s trading price.  If a deep, 
liquid  market  is  not  established,  those  investors  may  be  unable  to  sell  their  shares  at  a 
reasonable price, even after the time and expense of an IPO. 
                                                                                                                                                           
standard deviation of gross spreads were slightly lower for fixed price than for auctions.  In most countries, when 
auctions were first used, the fees were the same for auctions as for fixed price public offers. 
26  Many countries allow orders in fixed price public offers to be favored on the basis of order size, but this usually 
involves favoring small over large orders.  Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) show that favoring small orders may 
reduce the Rock (1986) winner’s curse.  Parlour and Rajan (2005) also examine rationing in IPOs. 
27   See, for example, Kaneko and Pettway (2003). 
28  although, during the internet bubble, many companies seemed more focused on short term hype than on a 




  Companies that go public but do not attract a following may end up being ignored and 
stuck in the so-called Orphanage
29.  If they do not attract an institutional investor following, 
they will not be followed by analysts and will not be monitored closely enough to be accurately 
priced.  This means that they will be unable to do follow-on equity offerings and will tend to 
trade at a substantial discount, due to their illiquidity and added risk.  In order to minimize this 
possibility, firms may be willing to pay, through underpricing, to attract the attention of serious 
investors in the IPO.  This may explain the importance of analyst coverage found in Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004)
30. 
  Thus there are many reasons why issuers may care about more than maximizing the 
proceeds of a one-time security sale.  Those who nevertheless maintain that issuers should 
focus only on minimizing underpricing will find that they are unable to explain the failure of 
auctions, since auctions have most often been driven out by fixed price public offers, long 
before book building appeared.  Fixed price public offers have generally led to initial returns 
that are substantially above the average for either auctions or book building
31.    
  Table 4 shows the initial returns for Singapore IPOs in 1993-1994, comparing auction 
and fixed price public offer first day returns.  Singapore allowed only hybrid auctions, with the 
fixed price and auction tranches occurring simultaneously.  The minimum auction price (i.e. the 
reservation price) could not be less than the price for the public offer tranche, and in practice, 
they were always the same.  Table 4.A gives figures for all IPOs, while 4.B looks at only Main 
Board IPOs, since Sesdaq fixed price public offers were substantially smaller (see II.A.1 for the 
differences in listing requirements between the Mainboard and Sesdaq).   
  Since Singapore’s auctions were hybrids, we consider underpricing from the issuer’s 
standpoint.  The weighted average initial return is the average of the auction and fixed price 
initial returns, weighted by the number of shares offered in each tranche.  As Table 4.A shows, 
the weighted average underpricing for all auctions was 16.1%, substantially lower than the 
36.9% for pure fixed price public offers.  The difference is significant using a one tailed test, 
with a t-statistic of 2.41.     
                                                 
29   Orphan stocks are also known as wallflowers.  See Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms. 
30   See Sherman and Titman (2002) for a list of additional reasons why issuers may prefer more accurate pricing. 
31   See, for example, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).  A 
key exception to this may be France.  Derrien and Womack (2003) found lower initial returns for fixed price 
public offers than for auctions in France, while Chahine (2001) found a lower median but higher mean, relative to 
auctions.  Thus, perhaps the only country in which auctions led to at least as much underpricing as fixed price 




  This brings up the question of why issuers did not sell more shares through the auction 
rather than the fixed price tranche, given that the auction clearing price could never be below, 
and was generally substantially above, the price in the fixed price public offer tranche.  Issuers 
were required by law to sell a minimum proportion of shares through a fixed price tranche
32, so 
one might guess that this choice was driven by a binding regulatory constraint.  However, most 
issuers were required to sell only 30% of their shares through the fixed price tranche, yet the 
mean was 48% and the median was 50%.  All but one of the twenty companies that used an 
auction substantially exceeded the minimum required shares for the fixed price tranche, while 
even that last company slightly exceeded the requirement.   
  Thus, many companies in Singapore chose a pure fixed price public offer even though 
average initial returns were lower for auctions, and nearly all companies that used an auction 
chose to sell more shares than necessary through the public offer tranche, even though this 
seemed to increase total underpricing.  We can find no evidence in the Singapore data that 
issuer choices were driven primarily by a desire to minimize underpricing.  All else being 
equal, however, it is likely that companies would prefer less underpricing to more.  Thus, it 
seems likely that the decision to avoid auctions is being driven by some other factor that more 
than offsets the higher apparent underpricing. 
   
III. Why IPO Auctions May Fail  
 
  In this section, we discuss what we believe to be the main explanations for the failure of 
IPO auctions:  the winner’s curse with endogenous entry, and the free rider problem.  We next 
describe why these problems may be especially difficult to overcome in an IPO auction setting.  
Last, we outline the predictions of theory regarding large multi-unit sealed bid auctions. 
  When we discuss IPO auctions in this paper, we generally mean standard sealed bid 
auctions, either uniform price or discriminatory (pay what you bid).  If the term “auction” was 
defined in a sufficiently broad sense to include an optimally designed mechanism, such an 
                                                 
32   Shares offered in the fixed price public offer tranche had to be a minimum of 40% or $3 million, whichever 
was larger, for offerings below $12.5 million; 35% or $5 million, whichever was larger, for offerings between  




optimal IPO auction would be more likely to resemble book building, rather than the simple, 
rigid, standard sealed bid auctions that people normally think of
33. 
III. A. The Winner’s Curse  
  There is an adverse selection and consequent winner’s curse problem for both uniform 
price and discriminatory auctions – those who get an allocation may have bid too high.
34  When 
the number of participants in an auction is unpredictable, the problem  of adjusting for the 
winner’s curse is particularly difficult, adding risk to the process. Oil lease auctions suggest 
that even experts face this risk.   
  The winner’s curse problem in common value auctions stems from the fact that, even if 
each investor has a valuable estimate of the value of the shares, each individual signal is less 
accurate than the aggregation of all of the signals. Since the signal has a “noise” component to 
it, if a bidder were to bid the value indicated by her signal and win in the auction, in part it 
would be because the bid was “too high” – the bidder probably bid much more than the value 
indicated by the signals received by all the bidders.   Thus, observing the consensus estimate of 
all bidders will cause each bidder to revise her original estimate.  Since the winning bidders are, 
by definition, the highest bidders, they are most likely to revise their estimates downward.  If 
unwary bidders bid their full valuation without adjusting for this, they will tend to overbid.    
  The solution to the winner’s curse is for all entrants to shave their bids accordingly, to 
adjust for the upward bias in unadjusted winning bids.  This adjustment must take into account 
both the expected number of other bidders and the nature of the information sets of those other 
bidders.  Optimal bid shaving works on average, although there will still be some variations in 
realized returns.  Clearly, even when information gathering is costless (endowed information), 
a high level of sophistication and computational capability is required to figure out how to bid 
in an auction taking winner’s curse into account.     
  In practice, bidders apparently find it difficult to adequately adjust their bids for the 
winner’s  curse.    Bazerman  and  Samuelson  (1983),  using  experiments  with  MBA  students, 
showed that winning bidders were subject to the winner’s  curse.   Kagel and  Levin (1986) 
                                                 
33 For example, the optimal auction in Spatt and Srivastava (1991) incorporates both pre-play communication and 
participation restrictions.  Jagannathan and Sherman (2005) offer several suggestions for a method that combines 
aspects  of  book  building  and  standard  auctions  to  make  the  process  more  transparent  and  less  vulnerable  to 
conflicts of interest while retaining many of the advantages of book building.  




showed that even moderately experienced bidders tended to bid aggressively, compared to what 
they would bid under a risk neutral Nash equilibrium.  Engelbrecht-Wiggins and Katok (2005) 
showed that bidders had an even harder time calculating their bids in experimental auctions 
with endogenous entry.  Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987) examined the return to bidders 
in outer continental shelf oil lease auctions in the Gulf of Mexico for the period 1954-1969.  
They found that returns were a decreasing function of the number of bidders and that returns 
were  negative  with  sufficiently  large  participation,  thus  illustrating  the  risks  that  even 
professional bidders face due to endogenous entry.   
  For an auction that is open to huge numbers of potential entrants but can profitably 
absorb only a small fraction of that potential, there will be no pure strategy equilibrium that 
leads  to  a  successful  auction.    Thus  we  must  consider  mixed strategy  equilibria,  but  these 
require an even higher level of computational sophistication among bidders.  Moreover, even if 
all potential entrants correctly calculate the optimal entry probability, there is still the risk that a 
large number of investors may unexpectedly enter all at once, since there is no coordination of 
ex post realized entry.  Unexpectedly high entry may lead to the auction clearing price being 
substantially above the intrinsic value of the issue.  
The following example illustrates this potentially large increase in the winner’s curse 
risk due to uncertainty in the number of bidders.   For expositional convenience, we assume 
that each investor observes the value of the stock being auctioned with noise.  Each investor’s 
observation is independent of the observation of other investors and is normally distributed 
with a mean of $20 (the true value of the stock) and a standard deviation of $6.  There are 100 
shares being sold, and each investor bids for only one share.  The market clearing price will 
thus be the 101
st-highest bid.   
  Suppose each bidder bids her estimate of the value of a share based on her observation.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of bids and the auction clearing price for N bidders, with N 
fixed at 120, 200, 500, and 1000 for one randomly chosen auction for each value of N.  In each 
auction shown, the average of all bids gives a fairly good estimate of the value of the shares, 
but the clearing price usually does not.  The clearing prices in the auctions shown range from 
27% below true value (winner’s virtue) with only 120 bidders to almost 45% above the true 
value (winner’s curse) with 1,000 bidders.   
                                                                                                                                                           




  Figure 2 shows only one outcome for each value of N, the number of participants.  We 
also examined 100 randomly generated auctions for each N, to examine the variations in the 
auction clearing price.  The average of all the bids in 100 auctions was very close to $20, the 
true value, for all five levels of N.  The auction clearing price, however, showed variation 
across 100 auctions: the clearing price had a range of $3.93 around a mean of $14.07 for N = 
120; a range of $2.95 around $19.92 for N = 200; a range of $2.14 around $24.96 for N = 500; 
and a range of $1.83 around $27.74 for N = 1000.    
An investor who had observed the results for 100 auctions with the number of bidders, 
N, fixed at 200 might conclude that the auction clearing price was on average $19.92, and that 
the average of all auction bids (a measure of the true value of the stock) was $19.96.  The 
winner’s curse would be rather small (-$0.08, or -0.16% of the true value of the stock being 
auctioned) for this case of 200 bidders for 100 units, since that is the one case in which we 
would  expect  the  mean  bid  and  the  clearing  price  to  be  similar,  without  bid-shaving.    An 
investor  who  is  willing  to  tolerate  a  maximum  loss  of,  say  $2,  may  be  content  to  bid  his 
observed value of the stock without any adjustment for risk.  In the 100 auctions we observed 
with N fixed at 200, the auction clearing price ranged from $18.32 to $21.27, and such a bidder 
would have lost at most $1.27.   
Suppose investors participate in such an auction under the assumption that the number 
of bidders is exactly 200.   If the actual number of bidders unexpectedly turned out to be 1000 
(i.e.,  10  times  oversubscribed,  which  is  not  unusual),  the  likely  loss  would  be  substantial, 
averaging about $7.65 (38% of the true value of the stock being auctioned).    An investor who 
was willing to tolerate a maximum loss of $2 would be subject to a large unpleasant surprise – 
she  could  have  experienced  a  loss  that  was  more  than  3.8  times  larger  than  expected  – 
illustrating the potentially severe nature of the risk due to the winner’s curse when there is large 
and unexpected variation in the number of participants in a uniform price auction.  The risks 
increase further when the precision of the information available to other participants in the 
auction is not known, or when it is possible that at least some bidders may not be sophisticated 
enough to calculate the optimal bid.   
  One  might  argue  that  variation  in  the  number  of  bidders,  from  120  to  1,000,  is 
excessive,  but  this  must  be  put  in  the  context  of  the  number  of  potential  bidders.    In 




bidders  varied  from  1,128  for  Eng  Wah  to  67,524  for  STIC  and  162,492  for  Singapore 
Telecom.  The quantity bid varied from a low of 0.18 times the number of shares offered to a 
maximum of 14 times, with the median being 2.63 times (see Table 6). 
  Unlike in auctions for US Treasury securities, the shares being auctioned in an IPO are 
difficult to value and differ greatly from one auction to the next.  The number of investors who 
have  the  necessary  ability  to  value  the  shares  of  any  one  offering,  and  the  nature  of  the 
information they possess, would vary substantially, in an unpredictable manner, across different 
IPOs.  This makes it even more difficult for a potential bidder to perform the complicated 
optimal bid-shaving calculation that is necessary for an auction to succeed.   Sherman (2005) 
observes that the uncertainty regarding the number of bidders in an auction adds risk
35.    
One reason for the failure of auctions, therefore, would be the risk of unpredictably 
large fluctuations in the number of participants, since, in a sealed bid IPO auction, participants 
do not know in advance how many other bidders will choose to enter
36.  In situations where the 
winner’s curse is extreme, bidders must optimally shave their bids so much in a sealed bid 
auction that expected proceeds may be higher through a posted price mechanism (see Campbell 
and Levin, 2006, Bulow and Klemperer, 2002, and Viswanathan and Wang, 2000).  Issuers 
may therefore prefer bookbuilding or fixed price public offer methods that help minimize the 
risks due to variations in the number of participants, and to differences in the quality of the 
information they possess, thereby increasing the probability of a successful IPO. 
III.B.  The Free Rider Problem 
In uniform price auctions, the expense of producing a reasonable bid may also lead to a 
moral hazard problem.  When information collection is costly, and when other bidders have 
done the analysis needed to value an issue, the incentive is there for a new bidder to enter and 
                                                 
35  French and McCormick (1984) show that auction bidders may recover fixed evaluation costs in an auction with 
endogenous entry, but they assume that entry is coordinated so that the ex post number of entrants is always 
optimal and known in advance by each bidder, which greatly reduces the risk each bidder faces.  Other auction 
models that include endogenous entry and information production in a common value setting include Hausch and 
Li (1993) and Harstad (1990), both of which consider only the single unit case.  Levin and Smith (1994) and 
Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) model endogenous entry in a single-unit, endowed information setting.  Matthews 
(1987) considers information production in single-unit auctions with risk-averse buyers.  Habib and Ziegler (2003) 
show that posted-price selling of corporate debt could be superior to an auction, if there is a cost to evaluation.   
36   One of the unique aspects of the Google auction in the US in August, 2004, could potentially have helped to 
alleviate this problem.  Google’s was the only IPO auction that we know of in which bidders were required to get a 
unique bidder ID from the issuer in advance, if they wanted to bid in the auction.  This meant that the issuer knew 




bid  high  without  collecting  any  information  at  all,  since  the  auction  clearing  price  will 
hopefully be set by those who have already done the necessary analysis.  This will break any 
pure strategy equilibrium; the auction will be a failure
37.   
There  may  be  a  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  in  which  each  bidder  balances  the 
probability  of  free  riding  and  getting  underpriced  shares  without  investing  in  information 
gathering against the risk that too many free riders might enter all at once, driving the price to 
excessive levels.  The optimal number of free riders would be well below X+1 in an X+1st 
price  auction.    Informed  investors  would  adjust  their  entry  and  information  acquisition 
decisions for the expected entry of free riders.  On average, the effect of free riders would be to 
reduce the incentive of other investors to produce information, thus making the auction pricing 
process less efficient and on average more noisy.  Sherman (2005) shows that each investor 
optimally collects less information in a uniform price than in a discriminatory auction, because 
of the moral hazard problem in uniform price auctions
38. 
The fact that less information would be produced in an equilibrium with free riders 
means  that  less  underpricing  would  be  needed  to  compensate  informed  investors.  
Unfortunately, however, there will also be positive expected returns for the uninformed free 
riders, and so total underpricing may not decrease at all and might even increase.  In addition, 
some auctions will be overpriced.  Since the only cost that free riders face in the mixed strategy 
equilibrium is this possibility of overpricing, free riders will choose their probability of entry 
such that there is a significant risk of such an outcome.  The expected or average number of 
free riders would be low enough to prevent them from overpricing most auctions, of course.  
But, without coordination of entry, the ex post actual number of bidders in some auctions 
would be high enough to cause the shares to be substantially overpriced.
39 
                                                                                                                                                           
did not, however, choose to make the information public. 
37 Kyle (1989) points out that under certain conditions, no one may invest in gathering information in equilibrium.   
38   The model predicts that there will be a moral hazard or free rider problem with uniform price auctions but does 
not incorporate excessively high bids by totally uninformed bidders.  This was left to future research. 
39   Bortolotti, Megginson and Smart (2006) show that auctions, in the form of block trades, have increased 
dramatically in the last decade and have become quite common around the world for seasoned equity offerings.  
The success of these SEO auctions fits well with our findings for IPOs, since the block trade auctions are single-
unit auctions among a small group of sophisticated buyers – investment banks.  The investment bank that wins the 
auction buys all of the shares at the winning bid price and then resells them on the market.  With only one buyer, 
there is no room for free riders.  Because the shares are relatively easy to value (since they are already trading) and 
the number of potential bidders is relatively small, these auctions are closer to Treasury bill auctions than to the 




Excessively high bids are probably the best way to distinguish the free rider problem 
from  the  more  commonly  recognized  winner’s  curse  problem  that  was  discussed  in  the 
previous subsection.  The key difference between the winner’s curse and the free rider problem 
is that the winner’s curse does not lead people to bid more than they genuinely believe the 
shares to be worth.  If they are optimally adjusting, they will shave their bids.  If they are naïve 
and do not adjust, they will still bid no more than the expected value.  With the free rider 
problem, however, bidders may deliberately bid an excessive amount, since the whole point is 
to blindly bid high enough to be “first in line” for the shares, rather than devoting time and 
resources to coming up with a reasonable bid.  Thus, bids which are too high to reflect any 
reasonable valuation are good indications of  free riders
40. 
III.C.  Difficulties Reaching a Robust, Stable Equilibrium 
  We have now laid out two problems with auctions – the winner’s curse and the free 
rider problem – both of which can be solved, in a sense, through sufficient bid-shaving.  If all 
bidders  are  sophisticated  and  are  bidding  optimally,  then  they  will  lower  their  entry 
probabilities and shave their bids to allow a return for their time and effort evaluating the stock 
and preparing a bid, and then will further adjust their entry probabilities and bids in response to 
the risks of free riders and the winner’s curse.  That would lead to substantial underpricing on 
average – perhaps more than would be needed for a posted price mechanism such as a fixed 
price public offer – even when a stable equilibrium may be possible. 
  But  a  stable  equilibrium  may  require  that  investors  have  extensive  computational 
capabilities,  which  may  not  be  feasible  even  for  sophisticated  investors.  Moreover,  it  is 
important that all potential investors, and not just a substantial portion of them, are able to 
calculate  and  implement  the  strategy  correctly.    Uninformed  entry  imposes  a  cost  on  the 
sophisticated investors that are devoting time and resources to correctly valuing the shares, thus 
making  them  less  willing  to  enter,  yet  the  uninformed  are  relying  on  these  sophisticated 
investors  to  set  an  appropriate  price.    For  the  equilibrium  to  work,  the  uninformed  must 
carefully calculate their entry probabilities so that they do not drive out the investors that they 
are relying on in the price-setting process.   
                                                 
40   An example of this was the IPO auction of Global Securities (Global Menkul Degerler A.S.), one of Turkey’s 
leading investment banks and brokerages, in May, 1995.  The minimum bid in the auction was 6,000 Turkish Lira, 




   The analysis in Viswanathan and Wang (2000) supports this view.  They show that 
there may not be a linear equilibrium when adverse selection is severe.  With book building the 
investment bank coordinates entry, while with a fixed price public offer at least the price is not 
subject to entry fluctuations.  Thus either method may be more robust than an IPO auction open 
to large numbers of unsophisticated investors, although this has not yet been fully modeled.  
We illustrate the possibility of such instability using Singapore IPO auctions.  
  Our earlier discussion of a free rider was of someone who chose not to invest time and 
resources  evaluating  the  current  issuer  –  i.e.  chose  not  to  do  due  diligence  on  the  current 
offering – but who still understood auction theory and how to calculate the optimal entry and 
bidding  strategies,  given  the  expected  strategies  and  information  sets  of  all  other  potential 
bidders.  In addition, there may be a more general type of free rider – we will call them return-
chasers – that do not understand the system but are simply attracted to any investment that has 
a good recent track record
41.  If some investors are more likely to enter the current auction 
when the last few have led to high returns, and if they also have a tendency to overbid, then it is 
very hard to imagine a stable equilibrium with auctions. 
  From the issuer’s standpoint, such potential instability of the IPO auction method may 
be a serious deterrent.  As discussed in II.C, issuers have many goals in mind during an IPO, 
including the ability to do future fund-raising in the market or to have a stock price that serves 
as a benchmark for employees, suppliers and customers who want to track the condition of the 
company.  Thus companies would tend to prefer a more accurate aftermarket valuation of their 
shares, which requires attracting a following among analysts and informed investors.  In order 
to guarantee that a stock develops a following and does not get overlooked, the issuer somehow 
needs to compensate investors for their time and effort evaluating the new security.  Book 
building can perform this role
42.     
                                                                                                                                                           
months of aftermarket trading, Global Securities’ stock price fell by 56.1% (a 60.5% market-adjusted drop). 
41   One can think of such an investor either as a type of irrational noise trader or as one who rationally chooses not 
to become ‘informed’ regarding optimal bidding strategies, given the substantial cost of learning auction theory. 
42  Underpricing as a way of inducing costly evaluation has been modeled in Sherman (1992), Chemmanur (1993), 
Sherman  (2000),  Sherman  and  Titman  (2002)  and  Busaba  and  Chang  (2003).    Yung  (2005)  models  costly 
evaluation by both investors and the underwriter.  Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Jenkinson and Jones (2004) and 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) offer evidence on  whether or not bookbuilding performs this role  in practice.  
Cornelli, Goldreich and Ljungqvist (2005) offer evidence that grey market trading reflects information from retail 
investors, and that institutional investors respond to this information in a sophisticated way.  Aussenegg, Pichler 




  Issuers may also be concerned that there may not be sufficient interest from investors, 
leading to a failed IPO.  Going public is an important and very public step in the life of a 
company, and the cost of a failed IPO is large.  In the words of Martin Manley, Chairman and 
CEO of Alibris
43, "Taking a company public is like getting a heart transplant: you only do it 
once and you need it to be done very, very well. It is not a decision driven by price."  With 
book building, an underwriter cannot make investors like an offering but can ensure that a 
sufficient number of investors attend the road show and seriously consider it.  With fixed price 
public  offers,  the  issuer  can  at  least  price  the  offering  low  enough  to  make  success  more 
likely
44.  Issuers and underwriters have little control in standard sealed bid auction, since they 
do not choose either the offer price or allocations. 
  Sherman (2005) shows that book building, by providing a superior trade-off between 
information production and proceeds maximization, has the potential to dominate both uniform 
price and discriminatory auctions.  When information gathering is costly, Sherman (1992) and 
Chemmanur and Liu (2003) show that even fixed price public offers allow underwriters to 
induce more accurate valuations, compared to auctions
45. 
III.D.  Summary of Predictions from Auction Theory Models 
Table 5 presents the predictions of theory regarding the underpricing and aftermarket 
performance of standard auctions.  The auction method should be relatively successful when 
information gathering is not an issue, and when auctions for the same type of securities are held 
at regular intervals so that the pool of participants in the auction is stable
46.  Auctions will be 
less reliable when a reward for information gathering and price discovery is important, when 
the number of bidders varies significantly over time in an unpredictable manner, or when a 
large number of bidders may try to free ride on the information gathering efforts of others.   
                                                 
43    See Mr. Manley' s blog, Jam Side Down, at http://www.martinmanley.com/ipo_diaries/.  Alibris held an IPO 
auction through WR Hambrecht in May, 2004, but cancelled it after observing the bids.   
44  This may explain the high average initial returns for fixed price public offers relative to other methods.  See 
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) for a model of underpricing of public offers as insurance against failure. 
45   Sherman (1992) models only fixed price (best efforts) IPOs, showing that costly evaluation may be induced 
even in a fixed price public offer.  Chemmanur and Liu (2003) compare such an offering to a uniform price 
auction.    Sherman  (2005)  also  shows  that,  when  information  acquisition  is  costly,  increasing  the  number  of 
potential bidders in an auction (beyond the minimum sufficient number) either lowers the mean or increases the 
variance, or both, in both the number of bidders and the accuracy of the auction price. 
46   Note that, with a relatively small numbers of potential bidders in a regular series of auctions, collusion is a 
problem and hence has been the subject of much academic research.  For IPOs, however, where millions of shares 




To summarize our conclusions regarding IPO methods:  (a) Auctions have a large risk 
of failure due to uncertainty about the number of bidders and the consequent large winner' s 
curse and free rider problems.  Auction participation rates may be unstable unless virtually all 
potential  bidders,  including  inexperienced  uninformed  investors,  are  able  to  implement 
complicated optimal entry and bidding strategies.  (b) Fixed price public offers may dominate 
auctions  when  it  comes  to  maximizing  proceeds,  inducing  information  gathering,  and  the 
transparency and the ease with which the method can be implemented.  (c) When information 
gathering is relatively more important, book building may be preferred, as it may lead to better 
price discovery and lower underpricing.  However, book building requires a relatively efficient 
market where underwriters compete with each other and thus is more likely to replace fixed 
price public offers in more developed economies with well-regulated, transparent markets.  
   
IV. Evidence of Uncertainty in IPO Auctions 
 
  As discussed in III.C, auctions may not always lead to stable, robust equilibria, given 
the uncertainty and the incentives they impose on investors.  In this section we show evidence 
of participation fluctuations (IV.A) and undersubscription (IV.B), both of which might occur 
periodically even in a stable equilibrium.  In IV.C, we show evidence that the winner’s curse 
and free riders, particularly return-chasers, may have lead to instability and ultimately to issuers 
rejecting the auction method.   
IV.A.  Evidence of Participation Fluctuations 
  There  are  many  indications  of  fluctuations  in  participation  levels  for  IPO  auctions.  
When Japan auctioned off parts of its railway system, the 1993 auction of Japan Railway (JR) 
East  drew  18,670  bidders,  while  the  1996  auction  of  JR West  drew  only  3,395  bidders,  a 
decrease of more than 80%.  335,000 JR West shares (20%) were left unsold.  When Argentina 
auctioned off its first telecommunications company, Telefonica, in December, 1991, it hoped 
for  at  least  80,000  bids  from  local  investors  but  received  more  than  100,000.    When  it 
auctioned off its other telecommunications company, Telecom, just a few months later, the 
auction drew more than 270,000 applications from local investors.  
  Amihud, Hauser and Kirsch (2002) found large fluctuations in the number of bidders 




over 3 years in Israel and found that orders ranged from 1,388 to 13,518
47.  Lin, Lee and Liu 
(2003) and Hsu and Shiu (2004) report wide fluctuations in bidder numbers for Taiwan' s IPO 
auctions.  There is also evidence of variation in the demand for Singapore auctions, as is shown 
in Table 6.  Subscription levels ranged from the Vickers Ballas auction, which was 1,300% 
oversubscribed  (at  the  minimum  bid),  to  Sunright,  which  was  82%  undersubscribed.    The 
number of bids ranged from 1,128 for Eng Wah to 162,492 for Singapore Telecom
48.   
IV.B.  Evidence of Undersubscription 
Many IPO auctions have been undersubscribed, when too few bidders chose to enter.   
IPOs may of course be undersubscribed under any method, because investors scrutinized the 
offering and did not like it.  But auctions (and fixed price public offers) carry an additional risk 
– that offerings may be undersubscribed simply because too many investors did not happen to 
consider them.  This is not a risk for book building where the underwriter manages the process, 
making sure that enough investors attend the road show and consider the shares.  With fixed 
price public offers, the shares may at least be substantially underpriced to reduce this risk.  
Thus auctions carry an additional risk of undersubscription, although suggestive evidence from 
small samples cannot prove that the increase in risk was significant in practice. 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) report that 3 out of 6 UK privatization auctions between 
1982  and  1987  were  undersubscribed,  while  one  was  500%  oversubscribed.    The 
undersubscribed offerings included Britoil, which was 73% undersubscribed (i.e. bids were 
received  for  only  27%  of  the  shares  being  offered)  and  Enterprise  Oil,  which  was  74% 
undersubscribed.  The auction tranche of Sunright, the last IPO auction in Singapore, was 82% 
undersubscribed, even though the public offer tranche, which was held at the same time as the 
auction, was oversubscribed.    
  Two of the most-respected Asian telecoms, Korea Telecom and Singapore Telecom, 
were auctioned off in October of 1993, at a time when Asian telecom stocks were hot.  The 
Singapore Telecom auction was heavily oversubscribed and priced far above expectations, but 
the  Korea  Telecom  auction  was  vastly  undersubscribed,  receiving  bids  for  only  10%  of 
available shares.  Given the strong reputation of Korea Telecom and the popularity of Asian 
                                                 
47   Multiple orders were allowed, so the number of orders might overestimate the number of bidders. 
48   Table 6 also shows substantial variation in demand for fixed price shares in the same offerings, so participation 




telecoms at the time, this offering is a reminder that no company is so well established that 
investor participation in an auction is assured.  In August of 2000, the Chunghwa Telecom IPO 
auction in Taiwan was only 72% subscribed, leaving 80.8 million shares unsold
49.   
  Most  of  these  examples  –  Britoil,  Enterprise  Oil,  Korea  Telecom  and  Chunghwa 
Telecom – were very large, well known companies.  At the other extreme in terms of size were 
the French IPO auctions on the unregulated over the counter Marche Libré or Free Market.  All 
26 of these French auctions
50 in 2002-2004 were greatly undersubscribed, with the mean and 
median subscription rates both below 20% (i.e. more than 80% undersubscribed).  While other 
IPO methods also led to undersubscription during this period, as shown in Table 7, subscription 
rates were dramatically higher for the other methods. In 2002, the mean subscription rates were 
19% for the 14 auctions and 69% for the 8 bookbuilds.  In 2003, the mean subscription rates 
were 19% for the 10 auctions and 143% for the 3 bookbuilds.  In 2004, the mean subscription 
rates were 15% for the 3 auctions, more than 200% for the 3 bookbuilds, and 141% for the 12 
fixed price public offers.   
  An example of the extreme undersubscription of these auctions is Leon Gas, which tried 
to sell 30,000 shares in its December, 2003 auction but received bids for only 210 shares.  Of 
the more than two dozen auctions in those three years, even the most successful sold fewer than 
half  the  shares  (41.6%).    It  is  possible  that  the  extreme  undersubscription  of  these  French 
auctions led to the return of fixed price public offers for Free Market IPOs.   
  As we saw in Table 2.B, the French Free Market auctions were small, with the average 
auction hoping to raise less than ￿ 1 million
51.  Such offerings may seem too small to be of 
interest, but they add to the overall evidence.  IPO auctions have been used for a wide range of 
issues, from small ones on France’s Free Market to large privatization offerings raising $1 
billion or more, such as Singapore Telecom, Argentina Telefonica, JR East or Japan Tobacco.  
Undersubscription has occurred for both the biggest and the smallest IPO auctions. 
  Data on the actual number of failed offerings may sometimes be difficult to obtain, for 
either auctions or fixed price public offers, since underwriters have an incentive to place their 
                                                                                                                                                           
for investors in a fixed price public offer, since it will not affect the price. 
49 For Chung Hwa Telecom in Taiwan, many argued afterwards that the reservation price had been set too high.  
This cannot explain Korea Telecom, which is one of the few IPO auctions that did not set a reservation price. 
50   This excludes a 27
th IPO auction, for Parfex, because the details are not available on the Euronext website.   
51   The bookbuilt IPOs during this period were larger but still small by most standards, while the fixed price 
public offers were even smaller than the auctions (although the amounts actually raised were similar for auctions 




own orders in an offering that is underwritten.  After all, if the underwriter will be forced to buy 
the shares either way, why not make the offering appear successful?  For IPO auctions in Israel, 
the Securities Authority found that many auctions that had been reported as having been strictly 
oversubscribed had, in fact, been undersubscribed, after adjusting for bids by the underwriter
52. 
IV.C.  Evidence of Instability 
  Stable  auctions  may  not  be  achievable  when  return-chasing  free  riders  are  present.  
Figure 1 suggests that some sort of updating of expectations occurs over time in countries that 
use IPO auctions.  Perhaps initially, investors participate in auctions based on the expectation 
that free riders will not be an issue.  Sooner or later, however, underpricing attracts more and 
more return-chasers, eventually leading to poor returns for winning bidders.  As IPO auctions 
fail to provide reasonable returns because of high entry and over-bidding, investors update their 
priors regarding IPO auction risk and expected return, becoming less willing to participate, and 
so  the  probability  of  an  undersubscribed  auction  increases.    If  issuers  persist  in  using  the 
method, the reduced number of bidders may eventually lead to higher initial returns, restarting 
the cycle.  However, after observing such volatility, issuers may instead turn to a more robust 
method, even if that method on average leads to greater underpricing. 
      IV.C.1  Argentina’s Experience 
  Argentina’s  short  experiment  with  IPO  auctions  illustrates  how  the  success  of  one 
auction may lead to problems with the next.  Argentina began a massive privatization program 
with the auction of shares in Telefonica de Argentina in December, 1991.  Institutional demand 
was lower than expected, since many professional investors thought that the minimum bid price 
was too high.  However, massive interest by retail investors drove the auction clearing price to 
45% above the minimum bid.  The stock rose another 20% during aftermarket trading, and the 
auction was described as a “smashing success”.   
  The  next  privatization,  for  Argentina  Telecom,  came  less  than  four  months  later.  
Because the Telefonica auction had been such a success, many were eager to cash in on the 
Telecom auction.  In fact, bankers were so eager that they “set up booths in the streets of 
downtown Buenos Aires offering to lend investors 80 percent of the purchase price of Telecom 
                                                 





53  Up to one-fourth of the shares purchased in the Telecom IPO were financed through 
90 day loans of between 80% and 100% of the purchase price.  Bids totaled almost 6 billion 
pesos, although the government had only hoped to raise 1 billion pesos.  The auction price was 
bid up to almost twice the reservation price, due to the strong demand from local investors.  
The initial return on Telecom’s IPO (based on the first day’s closing price) was 3.6%, which 
means that the stock would be considered fairly accurately priced in most academic studies.   
  But the auction price was unsustainable.  By the time the 90 day margin loans were due, 
the stock price had fallen far enough that many discouraged investors chose not to meet margin 
calls on their Telecom shares, while others sold other shares to meet their Telecom margin 
calls.   Brokerages had to dump more and more shares onto the market because of missed 
margin calls, causing a general market crash and the cancellation of up to 20 other planned 
IPOs in Argentina.  Telecom was later described as “viciously overpriced”.  The reason for this, 
according to a banker at Banco de Galicia, was that “Everyone had seen how well Telefonica 
(the other telephone privatization) had gone, and their total analysis was ‘if Telefonica was a 
sell-out  then  Telecom  will  be  too’.  What  happened  was  that  the  Dutch-auction  system 
exacerbated things because people pushed up their price to make sure they would get shares.”
54   
      IV.C.2  Singapore’s Experience   
  IV.C.2.a  Evidence of Free Riders    
  In Singapore, there were several examples of extremely high bids, a strong indication of 
the presence of free riders (as discussed in III.B): 
·  Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (STIC), May 1993: the reservation price 
was $0.85, the clearing price was $1.20, but bids went up to $9.80, a 1,053% premium 
(all premia are relative to the reservation price); 
·  Hwa Tat Lee (HTL), September 1993: the reservation price was $0.60, the clearing 
price was $1.02, but bids went up to $10.20, a 1,600% premium;  
·  Singapore Telecom, October 1993: the reservation price was $2.00, the market-clearing 
price was $3.60 but bids went as high as $100.00 per share, a 4,900% premium;  
·  Eng Wah, July 1994:  the reservation price was $0.65, the clearing price was $0.66, but 
bids went as high as $7.80, a 1,100% premium. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Globes (Online), August 11, 2004.  A similar practice has been used in Hong Kong, for fixed price public offers.   
53     “Argentina' s Stock Regulator Faces Daunting Task”, The New York Times; August 24, 1992, Section D, p. 3. 




  In  the  case  of  Singapore  Telecom,  the  reservation  price  of  $2.00  translated  to  a 
prospective price-earnings (PE) multiple of 27 times.  Many analysts considered this excessive 
for a well run but mature company, and thus many banks put caps of  $2.00 or $3.00 per share 
on the bids of those who borrowed to pay for their orders.  In the end, the highest bid was 50 
times the reservation price, implying a prospective PE of 1,350 times – hardly a reasonable 
valuation estimate for a mature company in an established industry. Even so, the stock price 
rose another 15% the first day to close at $4.14, “after which it was downhill all the way”.
55  
Although there was no dramatic crash, the stock price drifted steadily downward for more than 
a year, while the market as a whole was slightly up during the same period. 
  In  2001,  the  outgoing  chairman  of  Singapore  Telcom  called  the  auction  price 
“exuberant”    and  “too  expensive”,  making  it  “' difficult  for  the  stock  to  see  meaningful 
movement upwards, despite the company chalking up sterling profit growth which exceeded 
analysts'  expectations every year for the first five to six years after the launch”.  At the time that 
the outgoing chairman made these remarks, the stock price was $1.90, far below the $3.60 
auction price, even though “in terms of fundamentals, the company has done well”.
56 
  IV.C.2.b  Initial and One-Month Returns – Low and Declining Over Time  
  IPO auctions in Singapore offered positive returns on average, at least for investors that 
flipped (stagged) by selling on the first possible day.  The mean (median) return was 4.6% 
(2.8%), or 2.8% (0.6%) on a market-adjusted basis.  The standard deviation of returns was 
8.7% (9.1%, market-adjusted), and fully half of the auctions led to negative market-adjusted 
initial returns, so auctions were not without risk even for flippers. 
  For those that did not sell their shares on the first day possible, returns were lower.  
More than half of the auctions (13 out of 20) led to negative returns for investors that sold one 
month after the shares began to trade, using either adjusted or raw returns.  The raw (market-
adjusted) one month returns had a mean of -0.5% (-3.7%), a median of -2% (-1.7%), and a 
standard deviation of 12.4% (11.5%).   
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 3.A which shows one month raw auction returns 
ordered chronologically, returns got worse over time. Investors would have made money on 
five of the first six uniform price auctions in Singapore, if they had bought at the auction strike 
                                                 
55   “Half-million SingTel shares change hands at $ 3.60”, by Goh Soo May, The Straits Times (Singapore), 
January 26, 1996, Money Section, pg. 72. 




price and sold after the shares had traded for one month.  The average raw return on the first 
five offerings was 10.4%, for this holding period.  However, the returns were negative for six 
of the last seven auctions done in Singapore, with an average one-month return of -5.5% for 
these  auctions,  which  were  known  as  tenders.    People  noticed  the  poor  performance, 
complaining that auctioned  IPO shares were falling below their auction strike price on the 
aftermarket and joking that they must be catching a new disease called “tenderitis”
57.   
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 3.B, which gives one month excess returns for 
Main Board auctions only
58, relative to the All-Sing Index, a capitalization-weighted index of 
all stocks listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore.  The results are similar if we calculate the 
one month returns relative to the Straits Times Index (blue chips) or Sesdaq Index (smaller, 
younger companies), or if we use two month returns.  For investors that were learning and 
updating their priors over time, auctions were becoming less attractive. 
  Aftermarket  performance  among  fixed  price  public  offers  was  similar  to  that  of 
auctions, if both are measured from the first day of trading.  The poor aftermarket performance 
did not lead to negative returns for investors that participated in fixed price IPOs, however, 
since initial returns were substantially higher for public offers.  Investors that regularly received 
shares in fixed price public offers and held those shares for at least a month or two did well on 
average,  while  investors  that  regularly  received  shares  in  IPO  auctions  saw  declining  and 
eventually negative returns.  Thus auctions were a questionable investment, given the risk, even 
for those that flipped the first day, and they were clearly a poor investment for anyone that 
planned to hold their shares for a month or more.  And in equilibrium, it is not a feasible 
strategy for everyone to sell (and for no one to buy) on the first day of trading.   
The  incentive  for  free  riders  to  enter  should  have  been  lower  in  Singapore' s  IPO 
auctions, given their use of simultaneous hybrids with fixed price tranches.  Such hybrids are 
better than pure auctions at reducing the effect of free riders on the pricing process, since they 
offer  uninformed  investors  a  way  to  participate  without  distorting  the  price,  just  as  non-
competitive bids in US Treasury auctions allow smaller buyers to participate ' safely' .  Buyers in 
the fixed price tranche never end up paying more, and frequently pay less, on the shares that 
they  are  allocated.    However,  since  there  is  a  limit  to  the  size  of  the  fixed  price  tranche, 
                                                 
57   “New strategies needed for future IPOs”, Ven Sreenivasan, Singapore Straits Times, p. 13, February 3, 1995.  
58   This excludes the two Sesdaq auctions, Aztech and Datapulse, which both occurred in February, 1994.  The 




investors  may  be  allocated  very  few  shares,  particularly  in  hot  offerings.    Thus,  expected 
rationing of fixed price shares may still lead some free riders to bid in the auction.   
  IV.C.2.c  Lower Participation Rates Over Time, and Undersubscription 
  In the long run, an offering method that does not provide good returns for investors may 
not  be  able  to  continue  to  attract  them.    For  Singapore,  there  is  evidence  that  investors 
eventually became discouraged with auctions, although they were still relatively interested in 
public offers.  For Liang Huat Aluminum (the 5
th-to-last), the auction reservation price was 
$0.57.  The fixed price tranche, also at $0.57, was 750% oversubscribed, yet the auction was 
38% undersubscribed.  For the next three auctions - Eng Wah, Superbowl and Pokka - the 
number of applicants for fixed price shares was lower than for previous fixed price tranches but 
still  around  29,000.    However,  the  number  of  bidders  for  the  auction  tranche,  which  had 
averaged around 49,000 for the first 9 auctions, averaged only 1,300 (a 97% reduction) for 
these three auctions near the end of the cycle.   
  Although  demand  was  substantially  lower  for  these  later  auctions,  there  was  still 
evidence of extremely high bids, indicating that at least some free riders persisted while other 
investors  were  dropping  out.    In  the  Liang  Huat  Aluminum  auction  which  was  38% 
undersubscribed, bids went as high as $2.00, a 251% premium over the minimum.  In the next 
auction, for Eng Wah, the reservation price was $0.65 and the market-clearing price was only 
one cent higher, but bids went as high as $7.80, a 1,082% premium over the minimum. 
  We talked to the management of Sunright, the last company to do an IPO auction in 
Singapore, about why they chose an auction.  They explained that they were offered a choice 
by their underwriters - they could either do a pure fixed price public offer at $0.75 per share, or 
else sell part of the shares through an auction tranche with a reservation price of $0.75 per 
share.  Since the offering was fully underwritten (meaning that the underwriter would buy any 
unpurchased shares at $0.75 per share), and the fees were the same, the reservation price of 
$0.75 meant that a hybrid auction could not possibly result in lower proceeds than a pure fixed 
price public offer.  There was “only one way up from the fixed price”
59.   
However, the results of the Sunright auction may have made underwriters hesitant to 
offer such deals in the future, while the negative publicity surrounding the auction results could 
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not have been appreciated by the issuer.  Sunright’s fixed price tranche of 30 million shares 
was 22% oversubscribed, but the 20 million share auction tranche was only 18% subscribed 
(i.e. 82% undersubscribed), leaving the offering 20% undersubscribed overall.  More than ten 
times as many shares were ordered in the fixed price tranche as in the auction, even though 
investors could have bid for shares in the auction at $0.75.     
Although  only  two  out  of  twenty  uniform  price  IPO  auctions  in  Singapore  were 
undersubscribed, it must be remembered that the sample size, in this case, was endogenous.  
Regarding the first of the two undersubscribed auctions, Liang Huat Aluminum, a Straits Times 
article from June 27, 1994 claimed that the undersubscription of the auction was “an accident 
waiting to happen” and said that it should be taken not as a thumbs down for the company or its 
prospects but as  a sign  that investors were becoming “disenchanted”  with the  IPO auction 
(a.k.a. tender) system
60.  The article noted that “Of the seven issues with tender tranches this 
year, only Aztech is trading above its strike price”, and that “With Liang Huat, it seems many 
investors had become so disillusioned with the IPO system that they did not bother tendering”.  
The decline in the number of bidders in IPO auctions over time, combined with the 
declining returns to auction bidders and the fact that the two undersubscribed offerings came 
near the end of the experiment with auctions, all suggest that it was no coincidence that issuers 
never  chose  to  do  another  IPO  auction  after  the  Sunright  auction  was  substantially 
undersubscribed.   
To summarize, we have shown evidence of bidders placing unreasonably high bids in 
IPO auctions (IV.C.2.a);  deteriorating and eventually negative returns over time to bidders in 
Singapore’s IPO auctions (IV.C.2.b); and lower average bidder numbers over time, eventually 
leading to some undersubscribed offerings (IV.C.2.c).  The evidence is consistent with return-
chasers overbidding and driving out serious investors.   
      IV.C.3  A Quantitative Analysis of the Singapore Experience 
  The available data on auctions is sparse and not easily amenable to rigorous quantitative 
analysis using statistical methods, since most countries that have tried IPO auctions gave up on 
them after a few years, leading to small samples.  For the IPO auctions that have been done, 
data on participation levels are often unavailable
61.  We have data on the full sample of uniform 
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price  IPO  auctions  done  in  Singapore,  all  20  of  them,  and  will  attempt  a  quantitative 
characterization of that data in this section.  This is albeit a bit brave, given our sample size. 
  We argued in Section III.A that a high subscription rate (a large number of bids) in an 
auction  may  lead  to  overpricing  of  the  auction,  while  a  low  subscription  rate  may  lead  to 
underpricing, due to the winner' s curse.  We further argued in III.B and III.C that free riders, 
including return-chasers, may disrupt the bidding process.  We examine the data in three steps 
to see whether there is support for our conjectures.   
  First, we look for return chasing behavior to test whether high returns to participating in 
the preceding auction leads to a higher participation rate, using the following regression  
i u r Fi S S d lag i Ai + + + = 30 , 2 1 0 a a a                                    (1) 
where 
  SAi is the subscription rate in the i
th auction; 
  SF is the subscription rate in the fixed price tranche; 
  ri,lag30d is the return that would have been obtained by buying in the ( i-2)
nd auction and 
selling one month after trading begins. 
 
For the return from a previous auction, ri,lag30d, we use the return from 2 auctions ago because 
the one month return on the (i-1)
st auction is in general not available by the time the i
th auction 
is open for bidding
62.  We also considered the following variation of equation (1) above: 
 
i u r Fi N N d lag i Ai + + + = 30 , 2 1 0 a a a                                    (1’) 
where 
  NAi is the number of persons bidding in the i
th auction divided by the dollar value of 
shares offered in the auction tranche, at the reservation price; 
  NFi is the number of persons bidding in the i
th auction’s fixed price tranche divided by 
the dollar value of shares offered in the fixed price tranche. 
 
Our conjecture is that some investors are return chasers, and that such investors tend to 
bid too high in auctions.  In other words, return chasers are less likely to shave their bids 
optimally and may even attempt to free ride.  However, the number of participants in an issue 
may also vary due to variation in the underlying demand for the stock, unrelated to the presence 
                                                                                                                                                           
generally available. 
62 In two cases we had to use the 30 day return on the (i-3)rd auction since the return on the (i-2)nd auction was 




of return-chasing investors.  Thus we use SFi. fixed price tranche orders, as a proxy for the 
underlying demand for the stock, to control for such variation.  In Singapore, the auction and 
fixed  price  tranches  occurred  simultaneously,  rather  than  sequentially  as  in  many  other 
countries, making fixed price tranche demand a good proxy of overall demand. 
The estimated coefficients (t-values in parentheses) for equation (1) are, respectively: 
0.74 (0.85), 0.18 (4.27), and 14.18 (3.50).  The adjusted R-Squared is 60%. The corresponding 
figures for equation (1’) are: 0.00 (0.77), 0.03 (3.29), and (0.001) (2.26) with an adjusted R-
Squared of 39%.  Thus, both higher underlying demand and a higher return to participating in a 
recent auction led to higher participation in the current auction. In fact, unreported regressions 
showed that past returns and subscription rates were also significantly positively related for the 
fixed price tranches of auctions and for pure fixed price public offers.   
  Second, we examine whether the subscription rate in the auction affects the auction 
clearing price using the following regression: 
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where 
  PA is the auction clearing price. 
  PF is the price for the fixed price tranche (and the reservation price in the auction). 
   
As in the case of equation (1), we also consider the following variation of equation (2) 
 
i u Fi N Ai N
i F P
F P A P








2 1 0 a a a                               (2’) 
 
The assumption is that some of the variation in the subscription rate was due to return-
chasing investors who did not adequately adjust their bids for the winner’s curse, or perhaps 
even attempted to free ride, and thus bid too high.  As before, we use SFi. as a proxy for the 
variation in underlying demand for the stock for reasons other than the presence of return-
chasing investors.  The coefficients (t-values) for equation (2) are: 0.0163 (0.12); 0.0769 (2.88); 




(2’) are: 0.10 (0.74), 313.97 (3.30), and 15.15 (-0.13), with an adjusted R-Squared of 39%.  
Thus we found that the clearing price in the auction tends to be higher when more bidders enter 
and order more shares, even after adjusting for underlying demand for the stock itself. 
While a higher participation rate in the auction is positively related to a higher auction 
clearing price, the higher price may be “rational,” reflecting a higher intrinsic value of the issue 
over and above that reflected in the fixed price (and over and above the higher value reflected 
in fixed price tranche demand).  To rule out this possibility, in the third step, we therefore 
examine  whether  a  higher  auction  clearing  price  is  related  to  a  lower  return  following  the 
auction using the following regression:  
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where 
  r30d,au,i denotes the 30 day aftermarket return, starting from the auction clearing price. 
 
The  estimated  parameters  (t-values)  are:  0.04  (1.25)  and  -0.10  (-1.74)  with  an  adjusted  R-
Squared  of  10%.    The  evidence  supports  the  view  that  high  auction  prices  in  general  are 
associated with lower returns to auction investors, although auction theory would predict that, 
if investors are bidding optimally and are fully anticipating increased entry, then higher bids 
would tend to lead to higher expected returns (see Sherman, 2005). 
  To  summarize,  these  findings  are  consistent  with  our  story,  which  is  that  poorly 
informed  investors  (both  free  riders,  and  bidders  who  did  not  adequately  shave  their  bids) 
disrupted the bidding process, and that this along with the added risk due to endogenous entry 
eventually drove investors and issuers away from the auction method.  This is another way to 
summarize the evidence in IV.C.2 that some potential bidders in Singapore did not understand 
the auction method and were influenced by past returns
63.  Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2006) 
examine  Taiwan’s  discriminatory  IPO  auctions  and  also  find  evidence  of  return-chasing, 
particularly among retail bidders
64. 
                                                 
63 The conclusions do not change if we use excess returns over the Singapore stock market index instead of raw 
returns in the regressions. 
64    The Taiwan dataset is important because it is a relatively large sample of discriminatory auctions, and because 
data is available on all bids, as opposed to only summary statistics.  With discriminatory auctions, returns vary 
even among winning bidders in the same auction, since some investors pay more than others.  Nevertheless for 







  In this paper, we first established a surprising empirical regularity – that IPO auctions 
have been tried in more than 20 countries, and have been rejected in favor of other methods for 
bringing new equity issues to the market.   IPO auctions have been used for issues of all sizes, 
from very small to very large.  The auction methods used have varied, yet the outcomes have 
been surprisingly consistent:  When issuers have been  given  a choice,  they have  generally 
chosen not to use auctions once they became familiar with the method.   
  We did not find support for the common explanations offered for the unpopularity of 
IPO auctions in the US  – that issuers were reluctant to use a new, experimental method, or that 
underwriters pressured issuers to use methods for which they charged higher fees or were able 
to allocate underpriced shares.  We also did not find that issuers consistently preferred the 
offering method that led to the lowest initial returns.  There is little, if any, support for the 
popular view that auctions lead to highly accurate pricing and hence to a very low mean and 
variance of initial returns.  
  In  Singapore  and  in  other  countries,  we  found  evidence  suggesting  the  presence  of 
return  chasing free riders who placed unrealistically high bids, apparently  relying on other 
bidders to perform due diligence and engage in price discovery.  Eventually, investors began to 
lose  money  on  IPO  auctions  in  Singapore,  leading  to  lower  participation  levels  and 
undersubscribed  offerings.    The  number  of  orders  was  still  relatively  high  for  public  offer 
tranches  but  was  substantially  lower  for  auctions  of  the  same  shares.    Finally,  issuers  and 
underwriters gave up on the auction method and returned to fixed price public offers, a method 
that had traditionally been more stable, although also more costly in terms of underpricing. 
  We have shown that auctions have led to undersubscription and to extreme mispricing 
in practice, but it must be noted that other IPO methods have also led to withdrawn offerings 
and to mispricing.  Thus the evidence of problems with standard auctions may, on its own, be 
insufficient to establish which IPO method is superior. At the very least, however, the data tell 
us something about which auction models best fit the existing evidence.  The observed track 
record of IPO auctions appear consistent with costly evaluation/endogenous entry models but 
not with endowed information/full entry models, as shown in Table 5.  Given that people have 
                                                                                                                                                           




used the latter models to argue the superiority of the auction method, it is important to note that 
they do not fit the data.  Moreover, the very non-existence of large, stable samples of IPO 
auctions, despite the fact that more than 20 countries have experimented with standard sealed 
bid IPO auctions, is consistent with models that predict that IPO auctions may be problematic. 
  We found that participation variations have been a major source of problems for IPO 
auctions.    There  is  a  trade-off  with  auctions  in  terms  of  the  optimal  participation  level.  
Drawing too much attention may mean insufficient adjustment for the winner’s curse or the 
entrance of too many free riders, while too little attention makes it more likely that the offering 
might fail.  Even at the optimal number of entrants, there may be too many free riders and not 
enough serious investors in the mix, since the issuer/underwriter cannot control who enters.   
  With book building, the underwriter can act as a gatekeeper, coordinating the number 
and type of entrants.  With an auction, on the other hand, someone who invests time and money 
evaluating an offering can easily be squeezed out by a thousand free riders.  Although the 
relationships between investment banks and investors can lead to abuse under book building, a 
key problem with auctions is that they cannot guarantee serious consideration, particularly for 
smaller, less important offerings.  Without some way to screen out free riders and ensure the 
participation of serious investors, IPO auctions are highly risky for both issuers and investors. 
  Our findings are consistent with our expectations: that fixed price public offers should 
replace auctions in most or all economies, because fixed price public offers can control risk and 
limit some of the problems with auctions that we have discussed; and book building should 
replace fixed price public offers in more developed markets that have good institutions and an 
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Appendix A.  More information on the types of auctions used for IPOs. 
  Several types of IPO auctions have been used.  Brazil, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and the UK have used discriminatory auctions, while Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil,  Finland,  France,  Israel,  Malaysia,  the  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Peru, 
Portugal, Singapore, Turkey, the UK and the US have used uniform price auctions.  Dirty 
(priced below market clearing) auctions have been used in Australia, Belgium, Finland, France 
Hungary, Malaysia, New Zealand, Turkey, the UK and the US.   
  Not long after WR Hambrecht’s introduction of online IPO auctions to the US, Ord 
Minnett’s  eCapital
65  distributed  shares  in  two  Australian  online  IPO  auctions.    Both 
underwriters  used  uniform  price,  sealed  bid,  dirty  auctions
66,  although  eCapital  called  its 
process a “book build”.  For the eCapital auctions, the updated weighted average bid price was 
posted online twice a day during the auction period and bidders were allowed to change their 
bids, thus making them somewhat similar to the type of open auctions advocated by Ausubel 
(2002).  In South Korea, several Direct Public Offerings have used Internet auctions, although 
this method cannot legally be used if the company wants to list on the KSE or KOSDAQ.   
 
Appendix B. Do auctions price shares accurately? 
  There is a popular misconception, perpetuated in part by journalists, that auctions in 
theory lead to highly accurate prices.  The  general idea is that an auction reveals the true 
demand curve, since each person bids what he or she is willing to pay.  In Subsection III.D and 
Table 5, we showed that this is not true in theory, except under some extremely unrealistic 
assumptions.  In practice, there are many examples of highly inaccurate IPO auction prices 
(assuming that the first day' s closing price is a good estimate of the ‘true’ value). 
  Of course, book built and fixed price public offer IPOs have also frequently led to offer 
prices that were far from the first day' s aftermarket price.  Table 4 showed that, at least for our 
                                                 
65   The two auctions, for Health Communications Network (HCN) and ChaosMusic, occurred in 1999.  Since 
then, Ord Minnett merged with Chase and J.P. Morgan, and eCapital appears to be closed, reportedly because both 
auctions led to overpricing, thanks to free riders. 
66    Hambrecht  allows  dirty  auctions,  at  the  discretion  of  the  issuer.  There  has  also  been  one  hybrid  book 
building/auction in the US, for Instinet, priced on May 23, 2001.  The price was set and most of the shares were 
allocated through book building, but bidders in the auction portion, managed by WR Hambrecht, each received 




Singapore sample, auctions seemed to price IPO shares more accurately than fixed price public 
offers.  Nevertheless, Table 4 also showed that the variance in auction initial returns was far 
from zero.  We will now give examples to demonstrate that IPO auctions, in practice, have 
sometimes  led  to  very  large  positive  or  negative  initial  returns.    Some  examples  of  large 
positive initial returns from IPO auctions include: 
·  Tenaga  Nasional,  Malaysia,  May  1992,  34%:  Malaysia’s  first  auction  was  a  hybrid 
discriminatory auction/public offer.  Initial returns for winning bids ranged from 23% to 
34%, even though the market-clearing price in the auction was almost 46% above the 
4.50 ringgit reservation price.  The initial return for the public offer was 94%. 
·  DDI (an affiliate of Kyocera), Japan, September 1993, 49%: Bids went as high as ¥6.02 
million/share.  The offer price was set at ¥3.7 million, because most successful bids 
were concentrated at that price.  The first day' s close was at ¥5.5 million. 
·  East Japan Railway, Japan, October 1993, 58%:  JR East soared 70% above the market-
clearing price the first day, only to drop back down to around the ¥370,000/share offer 
price within two days.  Winning bids ranged from ¥352,000 to ¥623,000, so the highest 
bidders were still out of the money when the stock closed at ¥600,000 the first day. 
·  Petron, the Philippines, Sept. 1994, 63%: Hybrid discriminatory auction/public offer. 
The first day’s closing price was 63% above the lowest winning bid, 23% above even 
the highest bid, 39% above the highest foreign bid and 136% above the reservation 
price. The fixed price tranche drew 459,133 subscribers. 
·  Andover.net,  US,  December,  1999,  252.1%:  The  offering  was  priced  at  $18  even 
though the clearing price was $24, reportedly to avoid any delay.  The first day' s closing 
price was 164% above even the auction clearing price. 
·  Peet' s Coffee and Tea, US, January, 2001, 63.3%: Since this was a US auction, we 
know little about the bids that were placed.  It is possible that the clearing price was 
above the $8.00 offer price. 
·  El Al, Israel, June 2003, 40%: Demand was low in the auction – they sold fewer shares 
than expected, all priced at the minimum bid.  The shares began trading on the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange just two days later, closing up 40% the first day and up a total of 112% 
by the end of the second trading day. 
 
  Some examples of negative initial returns from IPO auctions are: 
·  Japan Telecom, September 1994, down 14.5% from the weighted average bid price of 
¥5.44 million/share on the first day, and down another 10% by the end of the week:  
The lowest successful bid was ¥5.22 million, but the public offer price (set after the 
auction) was ¥4.7 million, showing that the auction bids were considered unrealistic.  
The  weighted  average  bid  price  gave  the  company  a  P/E  of  219  times  prospective 
earnings, in a mature telecom market.  Bids went as high as ¥6.0 million.  The stock 




·  Japan Tobacco, October 1994, down 23.5% the first day, and it kept falling from there:  
The auction had been unusually enthusiastic, with a weighted average winning bid of 
¥1.438  million/share  for  shares  that  institutional  investors  valued  at  no  more  than 
¥800,000. Successful bids ranged from ¥1.362 million to ¥2.11 million.  It closed the 
first day at ¥1.10 million, and the second day at ¥1.06 million (down more than 26% 
from  weighted  average  bid  price).  The  highest  bidders  lost  almost  48%  the  first 
day.41% of the shares were never sold.  After 2 weeks of trading, it was at ¥956,000, 
down 33.5% from the weighted average winning bid. 
·  Global Securities (Global Menkul Degerler A.S.), Turkey, May 1995, down 11% the 
first hour:  The minimum or reservation price was set at TL6,000 per share, but bids 
went as high as TL100,000.  The auction price was set at TL9,750, a 62.5% premium.  
The price fell by 56.1% (giving a market-adjusted return of -60.5%) over the first three 
months of trading. 
 
  Thus, there are many examples of extreme initial returns resulting from IPO auctions.  
These clearly do not prove that auctions are inferior to other issue methods, but they show that 
the pricing accuracy of the sealed bid IPO auction method should not be taken for granted. 
 
Appendix C.  Do auctions lead to less underpricing, relative to book building? 
  The  overall  evidence  on  this  question  is  surprisingly  weak,  since  virtually  the  only 
relevant samples are from France and Japan, plus perhaps Germany and Australia (which did 
only  two  auctions  each)  or  eventually  Israel  (where  legislation  to  allow  bookbuilding  is 
pending, after ten years of mandated auctions). 
·  France:  A unique, theoretically sound version of auctions co-existed with a restricted, 
sub-optimal form of book building and with fixed price public offers, for several years; 
once the restrictions on book building were lifted, auctions dried up; during the overlap 
period, initial returns were lower for auctions than for sequential hybrid book building. 
·  Japan:  Auctions and book building did not overlap in Japan, but they were used in 
close succession.  Kutsuna and Smith (2004) found a small but statistically significant 
increase in initial returns under book building, and also found that a wider range of 
companies, including younger start-ups, were able to go public under book building.   
The evidence hints that auctions may lead to less underpricing, but it is inconclusive.    
 
Appendix D.  More country-specific detail on which IPO methods are allowed and used 
   This  appendix  is  posted  separately  on  the  Social  Science  Research  Network  at  the 




Table 1.  Summary of IPO Methods Used in Various Countries.  A blank in any column means that, to the best of our knowledge, the method 
was not used. The “first introduced” years are the earliest years that we were able to find but may be later than the actual year of first use.  On 
whether the book building method is now dominant or gaining in popularity, the answer is in the judgment of the main source listed in the last 
column, or our best estimate if no other source was available.  News article sources for any country are available upon request. 
 
PANEL A       
      Auctions  Book Building    
Traditional  First   Apparently  First  Now dominant   Hybrid with  Main Sources 
   method(s)  introduced  abandoned  Introduced  or gaining?  Fixed Price    
Europe                       
Austria   Fixed price        1992  yes  yes  Letter - Wiener Borse(Vienna Stock Exchange), 14 June 1996 
Belgium      1980s  1991  1993  yes     News articles; Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) 
Czech Rep.   Fixed price               E-mail, the Czech Securities Commission, 10/26/99 
Denmark   Fixed price        1992  yes  yes   News articles 
Finland   Fixed price        1993  yes  yes 
E-mail, Financial Supervision Authority of Finland, 11/29/99; 
^Letter - Mandatum & Co., 30 May 1996; www.rata.bof.fi 
France  
Auctions, 
fixed price  1960s  1999?  1993  yes  yes 
E-mail - Listing Division, Paris Bourse SBF SA, 7/28/2000, 
^Derrien and Womack (1999) 
Germany   Fixed price  only 2     1995  yes  yes 
E-mail- BAWe(Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandl) 
2/2/2000, www.bawe.de; ^E-mail - DGBank, 11/18/99 
Greece   Fixed price        1994  yes  yes   News articles. 
Hungary   Fixed price        1995  yes  yes  E-mail-Hungary Banking & Capital Mkt Supervision11/30/99 
Ireland   Fixed price        1992    yes  E-mail, Irish Stock Exchange, 9/15/ 99 
Italy   Fixed price  1980s  1986  1992  yes  yes 
E-mail,  Borsa  Italiana  S.p.A.  11/24/99;  ^Italian  Stock 
Exchange Commission (CONSOB) web page, www.consob.it 
Luxembourg            1996  yes     Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) 
Netherlands   Fixed price  1980s  1989  1994  yes  yes 
E-mail, Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer (Securities Board 
Of The Netherlands), Oct. 1999 
Norway   Fixed price        1995  yes  yes 
E-mail  -  Banking,  Insurance  and  Securities  Commission  of 
Norway, Sep. 99; ^Letter - Oslo Bors, 14 June 1996 
Poland   Fixed price  1993?     1995  yes  yes   News articles. 
Portugal   Fixed price  1987  1992  1995  yes  yes 
E-mail,  Comissão  do  Mercado  de  Valores  Mobiliários 
(www.cmvm.pt), 11/11/99. 
Spain      Only 2  1998   1993  yes  yes 
E-mails, Bolsa de Bilbao 11/16/99; *Comisiãn Nacional Del 
Mercado De Valores 9/23/99, 10/18/99. 
Sweden   Fixed price  1980s  1980s  1993  yes  yes 
Letter Finansinspektionen (Financial Supervisory Authority), 
12/18/1996; E-mail OM Stockholm Exchange 7/25/2000.  
Switzerland   Fixed price  1980s  1980s  1995  yes  yes 
E-mail  -  Switzerland  Stock  Exchange,  11/24/99;  ^Letter  - 
Zurcher Borse (Zurich Stock Exchange), 4 June 1996 





      Auctions  Book Building    
Traditional  First   Apparently  First  Now dominant   Hybrid with  Main Sources 
   method(s)  introduced  abandoned  Introduced  or gaining?  Fixed Price    
North & South America                    
Argentina      1991  1992  1993  yes  yes  E-mail - Comisiãn Nacional De Valores 1/29/99 
Barbados   Fixed price               Letter - Securities Exchange of Barbados, 8/28/97 
Brazil   Fixed price  yes       yes  yes 
E-mail,  Comissãƒo  de  Valores  Mobiliãrios  9/20/99; 
^www.bndes.gov.br.; *Letter - Bolsa Do Rio, 26 Aug. 1996 
Canada   Bookbuild          yes  yes  E-mail Com. des Valeurs Mobilières du Québec, 10/29/99 
Chile              yes     E-mail Sup. de Valores y Seguros 10/99; Santiago SE 11/99 
Mexico   Fixed price               E-mail, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores  Sept. & Nov. 1999 
Paraguay   Fixed price               E-mail - Comision Nacional de Valores, Oct 99 
Peru   Fixed price  yes     1996  yes  yes  E-mail - Lima Stock Exchange, 10/20/99 
U. S.  Bookbuild  1999  --     yes  yes  General sources 
Asia/Pacific                      
Australia   Fixed price  1999  1999  1992  yes  yes  Letter - Australian Stock Exchange, 23 April 1996 
Bangladesh   Fixed price               News articles. 
China   Fixed price          yes  yes  News articles. 
Hong Kong   Fixed price        1993  yes  yes  News articles, general sources. 
India   Fixed price        1993  yes  yes 
SEBI web page, Dec. 99;*Bombay Stock Exchange, 4/13/96;  
^Assoc. of Merchant Bankers of India, 5/27/96. 
Indonesia   Fixed price          yes  yes  Indo. Cap Mkt Supervisory Agency(BAPEPAM) 9/24/99 
Japan   Fixed price  1989  1997  1997  yes  yes  Pettway (1999); News articles. 
Korea   Fixed price  1993?       yes  yes 
E-mail, Korea Securities Research Institute 10/26/99; ^Korea 
Stock Exchange fax, International Relations, April 13, 1996 
Malaysia   Fixed price  1992  1994  1995  yes  yes  E-mail, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 1996; web page. 
New 
Zealand   Fixed price          yes  yes 
E-mail  10/15/99  Sec.  &  Exchange  Commission  of  New 
Zealand; ^Fax - Cavill White Securities Ltd., 21 May 1996 
Philippines   Fixed price  1994  1994    yes  yes   News articles. 
Singapore   Fixed price  1991  1994    yes  yes  E-mail - Stock Exchange of Singapore, 10/11/99; web page. 
Sri Lanka   Fixed price               Letter - Colombo Stock Exchange, 26 May, 1997 
Taiwan   Fixed price  1995  ?         E-mail Chinese Securities Association, 11/2/99 
Thailand   Fixed price           yes  yes  Letter - Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 May 1996;  
Africa/MidEast                    
Kenya   Fixed price               Fax, Capital Markets Authority, 4/3/00 
Israel  
Auctions, 
fixed price  < 1993  ?        
e-mails - Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Feb., Sept. and Oct. 1999 
Jordan   Fixed price               E-mail, Amman Stock Exchange, 24 June, 1997; web page. 
Pakistan   Fixed price        1995  no     E-mail, SEC of Pakistan, 12/01/99; ^web page - Karachi SE  
South Africa   Fixed price            yes  Web page, e-mail - Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 10/99. 




Table 2.  Comparison of offering sizes for auctions and other IPOs 
 
2.A  Offering sizes for IPOs in Singapore (in millions of Singapore Dollars), 1993-1994.  
The Singapore Telecom IPO was more than 12 times as large as the next-largest Singapore 
auction and was perhaps the largest IPO auction ever (raising more in total proceeds than, for 
example, the US IPO of the popular search engine company Google, which occurred more than 
a decade later).  Since this was clearly an outlier in terms of offering size, we also report the 
proceeds for Main Board auctions excluding SingTel. 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Main Board Auctions  337.6  48.4  1,002  4,332  16 
Main Board Auctions, Excluding   
Singapore Telecom  102.7  44.8  99  338  16 
Main Board Fixed Price  56.5  37.7  54  200  17 
Sesdaq Auctions  67.2  67.2  33  90  44 
Sesdaq Fixed Price  11.6  9.3  7  30  4 
 
 
2.B  Offering sizes for French Free Market IPOs (in thousands of Euros), 2002-2004.   
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Fixed Price  517.1  35  685  1,875  7.9 
Auctions  739.5  600  554  2,291  150.0 
Bookbuilding  1,493.6  1,050  954  4,200  818.9 
 
 
2.C  Offering sizes for IPOs in Turkey (in billions of Turkish Lira), 1994-1995.   "Sale on 
the ISE" is a method in which shares begin trading directly on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Fixed Price  387.8  240.0  455  1950  50.0 
Auctions  378.7  304.8  288  1121  11.3 






Table 3.  Industry comparison, auctions and other IPOs, based on ICB classifications 
 
3.A  Singapore IPOs by Industry, 1993-1994.  
   Fixed price  Auctions  % Auctions 
Total IPOs 
in Industry 
Basic Materials  2  2  50%  4 
Industrials  15  5  25%  20 
Consumer Goods  3  3  50%  6 
Consumer Services  4  1  20%  5 
Telecommunications    1  100%  1 
Financials    4  100%  4 
Technology  7  4  36%  11 
Total:  31  20  39%  51 
 
 
3.B  France Free Market IPOs by Industry, 2002-2004.  





Basic Materials     1    100%  1 
Industrials   3  7  4  50%  14 
Consumer Goods   3  3  2  38%  8 
Health Care   1  2  1  50%  4 
Consumer Services   1  3  4  38%  8 
Telecommunications   1  1  1  33%  3 
Utilities  1  1  1  33%  3 
Financials     2  2  50%  4 
Technology  3  7    70%  10 
Total:  13  27  15  49%  55 
 
 
3.C  Turkey IPOs by Industry, 1994-1995.  





Basic Materials  3  5  3  45%  11 
Industrials  3  4  1  50%  8 
Consumer Goods  6  10  1  59%  17 
Consumer Services  1        0%  1 
Financials  8  6  3  35%  17 
                 




Table 4.  Initial returns for Singapore IPOs, 1993-1994    The average initial return for an 
auction is the weighted average of the initial return on the auction tranche and the initial return 
on the public offer tranche.  The T-stats are for the difference between the means of pure fixed 
price public offers and one or both tranches of the auctions, in a one-tailed test. 
 
4.A.  Initial returns for all IPOs.  There were 51 IPOs in 1993-1994 in Singapore, including 
31 pure fixed price public offers and 20 hybrid auctions. 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum  T-stat 
Auction tranche  4.6% 2.8% 8.7% 22.5% -6.0% 3.90
Fixed price tranche, auctions  51.3% 33.2% 49.1% 188.9% 2.0% -1.06
Pure fixed price  36.9% 18.2% 44.9% 131.1% -11.0% -
Average for hybrid auctions  16.1% 11.7% 13.9% 47.9% 0.4% 2.41
 
4.B.  Initial returns for only Main Board IPOs, 1993-1994.  There were 29 Mainboard IPOs 
in 1993-1994 in Singapore, including 11 pure fixed price public offers and 18 hybrid auctions.   
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation Maximum  Minimum  T-stat 
Auction tranche  3.3% 2.4% 8.2% 22.5% -6.0% 1.74
Fixed price tranche, auctions  49.0% 28.0% 51.3% 188.9% 2.0% -0.94
Pure fixed price  30.5% 2.2% 51.6% 131.1% -11.0% -
Average for hybrid auctions  14.4% 9.9% 13.5% 47.9% 0.4% 1.02
 
 
Table  5.    Predictions  of  various  models  for  the  results  of  a  sealed  bid  uniform  price 
auction open to a large number of potential investors (high N) 
   Average   Variance  Aftermarket  Varying  Free 
   initial   in initial  price  participation  rider 
Models   return  returns  accurate?  levels?  problem? 
Independent private 
values   Zero  Low or zero  Yes  No  No 
Endowed signals; 






possibly high  Yes  Yes  No 
Costly evaluation; 












Table 6.  Participation variations for Singapore IPO auctions, 1993-1994.  Data include all 
20 auctions except for the number of applications, which is based on only 19 of the 20 IPO 
auctions  in  Singapore  during  this  time  period.    The  missing  application  numbers  are  for 
Sunright, the last auction, which was heavily undersubscribed and chose not to release the 
number of bidders.  The subscription rate is the ratio of shares applied for to shares available, 
so  a  subscription  rate  below  one  means  that  the  offering  was  undersubscribed,  while  a 
subscription rate of 11 means that the offering was 1,000% (ten times) oversubscribed.  Shares 
applied for and available are in 1,000s. 
 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Subscription rate, fixed price   15.63  12.40  12.39  41.00  1.22 
Subscription rate, auction  3.99  2.63  3.44  14.00  0.18 
# Applications, fixed price  176,446  159,848  167,386  795,272  28,036 
# Applications, auction  25,046  7,765  39,513  162,492  1,128 
Shares applied for, fixed price  426,161  322,034  384,333  1,672,000  32,042 
Shares applied for, auction  325,950  113,577  626,730  2,800,000  3,600 
Shares available, fixed price  52,409  24,700  117,908  550,000  9,737 
Shares available, auction  71,071  29,400  119,625  550,000  12,000 
 
 
Table 7.  French Marche Libre IPOs, 2002-2004.  Subscription rates for 49 of 54 IPOs 
during 2002, 2003 and 2004.  We are missing the data on one auction (Parfex) in 2003 and four 
fixed price public offers in 2004.  A subscription rate below 100% means that the offering was 
undersubscribed,  while  a  subscription  rate  of  120%  means  that  the  offering  was  1.2  times 
subscribed, or 20%  oversubscribed.  Source:  the Euronext website. 
 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Maximum Minimum 
% of IPOs 
Undersubscribed 
Auctions  18%  20%  12%  42%  0.7%  100% 
Bookbuilding  120%  88%  86%  348%  1.2%  60% 






Figure 1.  How auction use evolved over time in four countries.  In each graph, the X’s  
(right axis; connected by dashed lines) give the number of total IPOs per year in that country, 
while the diamonds (left axis; connected by solid lines) are the percentages of IPO auctions out 
of all IPOs. 
 






















































































Sources for Figure 2:  A. Singapore – E-mail from the Stock Exchange of Singapore, October, 
1999.  B.  Taiwan – The data was given to us by K.C. John Wei.  See Liu, Wei and Liaw 
(2001) and, for 2002-2003 data, Hsu and Hung (2005).  C. Turkey – E-mail from the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, March, 1999.  D.  France Second and Nouveau Marches – From Derrien and 
Womack  (2003)  and  Chahine  (2001).    E.    France  Marche  Libre  –  Euronext  website 




Figure 2.  Distribution of simulated bids for various entry levels.  Bids were generated from 
a normal distribution with a mean of $20 and standard deviation of $6.  There are 100 shares 
being sold, so the clearing price is the price of the 101
st-highest bid, shown by the dark line. 
 
 A.  120 Bidders  Average Bid = $19.81



































B.  200 Bidders  Average Bid = $19.23

































C.  500 Bidders  Average Bid = $20.05
































D.  1,000 Bidders  Average Bid = $19.90






































Figure  3.    One  month  buy-and-hold  returns  for  Singapore  auctions,  ordered 
chronologically.  Singapore’s auctions are ordered by date to show how the returns to bidding 
evolved over time.  3.A. gives raw one month returns for all 20 auctions.  3.B. shows only the 
18 Main Board auctions (excluding Datapulse and Aztech on Sesdaq in February, 1994), giving 
one month returns relative to the All-Sing Index, a capitalization-weighted index of all listed 
stocks.  The 4-offering moving average is the average return on the last 4 offerings (or all 
previous, if fewer than 4).  
 















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.B  One Month Excess Returns on 












































































































































































































































































































   
 